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ABSTRACT 
Nationalist sentiment has a long history in the Basque regions of northern Spain. 
Culturally separate from the dominant Castilian society, separatists have for many years 
advocated for an independent Basque state. Following democratic reforms under the 
Constitution of 1978, regional cultures and languages were explicitly recognized and 
protected in Spain. This allowed for the current set of language laws in the Autonomous 
Community of País Vasco in which Castilian Spanish and the Basque language of 
Euskara are held in equal status and recognition. Furthermore, Euskara has been 
recognized as a defining characteristic of Basque identity. The regional government has 
instituted a three-track education system in which students choose to be taught in varying 
ratios of Euskara and Castillian. This work explores ideas about language education and 
usage as it relates to the development of national identity in young people in the city of 
Bilbao. It shows that the everyday choices made about language in the region are 
complicated and not merely reflections of nationalist ideology. There are often pragmatic 
choices made reflecting economic realities or simple daily convenience. These basic 
trends though are further complicated by normal adolescent social negotiations. The 
language of Euskara is still an important identifier for individuals in the region, but there 
are now many perceived reasons for achieving fluency in it other than to make a political 
or cultural statement. These results illustrate a complicated picture of nationalism in the 
region and raise questions about its shifting focus and importance in future generations.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of “Europe” today is often one of states operating together in relative 
harmony and setting a collective standard for the model of a socially democratic society. 
This image is especially fostered under the auspices of the European Union. The EU has 
been undergoing an integration process for more than half a century, tying states together 
through economic interdependence, legal directives, and open internal borders. However, 
the image that is presented by European leaders – that of a unified, respectful community 
operating in harmony and peace – glosses over many of the underlying tensions found in 
this system. The EU has arguably done a remarkable job at completing its original 
objective in preventing continental war between states through economic integration. 
However, this integration and lack of war has not necessarily translated into tamping 
down the nationalist sentiments that so readily contributed to conflict in the past. It has 
rather coincided with the development of multiple competing conversations about 
citizenship and identity in Europe today. There are conversations still about competing 
national identities at the state as well as the sub-state levels. In addition, there is 
discussion about the development and role of multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, 
discourses of tolerance, and cultural assimilation in European societies. 
These discussions about identity are often tied in with those about language policy 
and public usage. These are not just conversations that surround debates about immigrant 
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populations; rather, they often also involve “traditional” European minority groups. Even 
in the European Union – which has 23 official and working languages – there are a 
plethora of regional minority languages which are supposedly protected by EU directive. 
These minority languages are oftentimes perceived as being integral to regional, sub-state 
identities that are separate from those propounded by the state government or the EU 
offices in Brussels. This study seeks to examine these issues – the role and changing 
nature of nationalism and national identity in Europe and the impact of specific language 
policies – through a very specific case in the Basque region of northern Spain. Sited in 
the Autonomous Community of País Vasco, it considers the relationship between 
language education and daily language usage among young people and their developing 
senses of identity. 
País Vasco serves as a useful site for this study because there is a long history of 
nationalist sentiment in the Basque regions. Culturally separate from the dominant 
Castilian society with their own distinct regional language, separatists have for many 
years advocated for an independent Basque state. Through the centuries the region has 
exercised varying levels of autonomy until the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939 
which resulted in the rise of Francisco Franco, the centralization of power in Madrid, and 
the attempted suppression of regional identities. Following democratic reforms under the 
Constitution of 1978, regional cultures and languages were explicitly recognized and 
protected in Spain. This allowed for the current set of language laws in the Autonomous 
Community of País Vasco in which Castilian Spanish and the Basque language of 
Euskara are held in equal status and recognition. Throughout all of this Euskara has come 
to be recognized as the most common marker of Basque identity. With wide-ranging 
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autonomy granted to it from the central government in Madrid, a nationalist dominated 
regional government instituted a three-track education system based on instruction in 
varying ratios of Euskara and Castillian. This project explores the relationship between 
language education and the development of national identity in Basque young people in 
the city of Bilbao, Spain. It also ponders the role and meaning of this identity as these 
young people face the continued integration and increased globalization of the EU at the 
same time that there is substantial financial uncertainty in the region.  
This project then is centered on three main questions. First, how are how are multiple 
national political projects reflected in language policy in País Vasco? Given that 
nationalist governments put these policies in place and have continued to revise them 
over time, it is important to understand the ways in which the ideologies underpinning 
various political movements might be seen in the policies which govern language, 
particularly in a school setting. Second, why do parents (and to a lesser extent young 
people) make certain school and language education choices? Are these reflective of 
nationalist sentiments or something else? Parents are legally entitled to decide which 
language model school their child enters. At the most basic level this would seem to be 
based on which language the child is most familiar or, in the face of nationalist rhetoric, 
the position a parent takes on Basque nationalism. However, there may be other and 
possibly more complex issues to consider. Third, how are young people’s daily language 
choices and usages informed by the various political projects operating in País Vasco? In 
an officially bilingual society in which language usage can have a very political meaning, 
we can question whether actual daily usage reflects these political connotations or has 
different, possibly more pragmatic, meanings.  
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This project is organized in order to address these questions first at the theoretical and 
then at the empirical level. The first chapter of this work examines academic literature 
organized around three central themes. It first begins with a section discussing the origins 
of nationalism and the theoretical development of national identity. This first section also 
addresses current discussions about the role of nationalism, multiculturalism, and 
associated theories in Europe today. Acknowledging the role that language plays in the 
development of nationalist movements, the second section in this chapter examines the 
usage and role of language policies in society in general and in language education 
specifically. The last section examines ideas about youth populations, spaces, and 
identities as well as their political agency. Throughout this chapter I examine the 
competing interests that come from sub-state and state-centric national projects, as well 
as the competing projects of the European Union. 
 The second chapter presents project context and explains the methodological 
framework in which the research fieldwork was conducted. In it I explain the process for 
selecting informants and provide basic demographic information about them with special 
attention paid to explaining the subset of young people who made up the primary 
informant group. There is a brief discussion about the site city of Bilbao and why 
understanding its context in the region is important for understanding the study. The 
chapter ends by describing briefly the type of analysis done, explaining the terminology 
used throughout this project, and underscoring researcher positionality throughout the 
work. 
The third chapter provides information necessary to understanding the historical setting 
and context for the current political situation in País Vasco.  This chapter has two main 
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sections. The first describes the historical and political development of the Basque 
provinces of Spain, culminating with the creation and current status of País Vasco today. 
In doing so, it also traces the history of Basque nationalist movements and the varying 
levels of autonomy from the Spanish central state that have underpinned the Basque 
political system for centuries. In explaining these historical developments, I provide 
information that allows the reader to examine project analysis in historic context than just 
the past few decades specifically mentioned by most informants. The second section of 
this chapter builds on this by explaining the development and standardization of Euskara 
and the structure of the Basque education system today. This allows the reader to 
understand the complexities that arise when discussing the language itself, as well as to 
understand the school choices that parents and students face when beginning a child’s 
education. 
The fourth chapter discusses the data collected and provides some analysis of it. This 
analysis covers several main themes: school choice and the perception of each of the 
school models available to students; youth spaces, social interactions, and daily language 
negotiations; and understandings of political projects in País Vasco. Throughout this 
analysis I contend that while nationalist rhetoric and feelings do sometimes play roles in 
school and language choices, so too do pragmatic decisions such as desirability as an 
employee or acclimation to a multilingual region. I also discuss the ways in which 
various national projects become meaningful to young people, ranging from the regional 
Basque nationalists to the Spanish state to civic ideals pushed by the European Union. I 
end with a brief discussion about what this possibly means for the future of nationalist 
movements in País Vasco. 
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 The fifth and final chapter of this project is a brief summation of prior information 
and concluding remarks on it. In particular, I posit questions about what exactly the case 
of the Basque region can tell us about nationalism and the development of national 
identity today. It also includes suggestions for future research to future flesh out these 
ideas. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE 
This project explores the relationship between language education and the 
development of national identity in youth populations. Three distinct yet related literary 
themes which need to be explored. Throughout this project, I seek broadly to explore how 
different political projects are incorporated into language policies in the Basque region, 
how different nation-building projects become meaningful to young people in the region, 
and how schools and other social spaces serve as sites in which nation-building projects 
and language policies come together for young people. These questions recognize that 
there are multi-scalar national projects competing at the state, sub-state, and European 
levels in Spain. Basque nationalists seek to impose their national identity through 
conscious and unconscious means just as Spanish nationalists centered in Madrid want to 
subvert the regional ideologies with their own symbols. At the same time there are 
European ideals at work which further complicate the issue. However, this work develops 
the idea that the development of national identity in the Basque region today is complex 
and internally negotiated by indivudals. Rather than being imposed by elites, a variety of 
personal choices and societal pressures affect the way in which young people identify.  
The following analysis draws of three bodies of literature: 1) nationalism and 
national identity, 2) language development and language education, and 3) youth 
development and spaces. In this order each of the succeeding sections builds on the 
previous ones and constructs the framework within which this project is based. 
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2.1: NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 This discussion starts with the idea of nationalism and how it has developed over 
time. Understanding this basic concept is important because it lays the groundwork on 
which things like national language policies are based. Nationalist rhetoric is employed in 
educational policies that are enacted in schools and thus conveyed to young people. In 
order to understand how those messages and national projects become meaningful to 
young people and the role spaces such as schools play in that process, the grounding 
provided by this literature is essential. 
The terms nation, state, and nation-state are often confused in vernacular speech, 
but for this project must be understood as independent concepts. “The institution of the 
nation-state represents an amalgam of two entities: the state as a set of political 
institutions and the nation, conceived of as the political and cultural community of 
people” (Holton 1998). The state is territorial, a structural manifestation of power that 
operates as the governing authority within given boundaries. The nation, in contrast, is 
not government but rather a community of individuals who conceive themselves and/or 
are conceived by others conceived to be bound together by common cultural ties – be 
they language, ethnicity, religion, origins, destiny or otherwise – which can then be 
manifested as a group identity and political will. The concept of the nation-state is one in 
which these two ideas are melded together to signify a state apparatus constituted by and 
through a single united people – the nation – within it. Nationalism represents the 
ideological articulation of peoplehood and sovereignty as it rises out of and often acts in 
concert with these ideas. However bound up the terms may be though, they are not 
synonymous. This has become the dominant mode of political-territorial organization in 
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the modern world. The assumption of congruence between nation and state and the 
conflation of these terms masks the fact that the structural entity of the state may not be 
coterminous with the “community of people” upon which it seeks to impose its will and 
may in fact contain several such communities that are actively engaged in the process of 
self-constitution. Furthermore, even these “communities” are themselves actively 
constructed and are never pre-existing. 
Nationalism has been defined as the “modern social and political formations that 
draw together feelings of belonging, solidarity and identification between national 
citizens and the territory imagined as their collective national homeland” (Sparke 2011). 
Nationalism can also be described as “(1) the attitude that the members of a nation have 
when they care about their identity as members of that nation and (2) the actions that the 
members of a nation take in seeking to achieve (or sustain) some form of political 
sovereignty” (Miscevic 2010). Lastly, Haas concisely defines it as “the convergence of 
territorial and political loyalty irrespective of competing foci of affiliation” (1986). These 
definitions of nationalism suggest, first, the ideological practices and discourses that 
construct and sustain one “national” identity over another suggests some claim to group 
sovereignty – they are people with similar origins and common destiny. Second, 
nationalism is inherently political and ideological. Third, nationalism is also directly tied 
to the idea and claims of territorial sovereignty. 
The creation of a national identity 
 There are competing theories describing the historical development of national 
identity which have different implications for understanding the role of nationalism in 
current societies and how nationalist movements function within the framework provided 
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by a global system, the European Union, and Spain itself. These theories fall into two 
camps, one that views nationalism purely as a product of modernity and the other that 
traces nationalist sentiment to more ancient processes of identity, termed here primitive 
theories. Primitive theories are labeled as such not because they are necessarily less 
developed but rather because they rely on an understanding of national identity that 
stretches back into ancient – or primitive – epochs of history. Modernist theories receive 
their designation because they understand national identity as being rooted in much more 
recent times and events – specifically in “modernity”, an explicit historic time period. 
The idea of a primitive development of national identity is an interesting but 
somewhat flawed notion. Expounded particularly by Anthony Smith, this conception of 
nationalism sees it as a “primitive” idea, often wrapped up in the idea of ethnic origin 
(Smith 1993). He labels these groups ethnos, building on terminology coming from 
ancient Greece used to describe “a band or host or tribe”. Building up from this, Smith 
says that groups which share common cultural traits or kinship form an ethnos. These 
groups, he contends, form the ethnic core at the heart of modern state development. 
While he may admit that national identity is a recent development in history, Smith 
nonetheless feels that it grows out of this older ethnic underpinning. It is important to 
note here though that Smith is not to be equated with “primordial” or strict primitive 
views of national development. He acknowledges the modern development of national 
identity but sees is as rooted in the deeper past. He does not, however, adopt the 
extremely flawed view of nineteenth century theorizing or ultra-nationalist demagogues 
who hold identity to be a linear development from the proverbial mists of time. 
Nevertheless, even though Smith’s ideas are not hardline primordialism, they are 
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problematic. To argue that ancient ethnos formed the core of modern national 
development is to ignore the role of modern elites in the process. 
However, Smith’s work is useful in that he highlights the quasi-religious aspects 
of modern nationalism (see also Haas 1986). Because nationalism has the seeming ability 
to evoke emotions and loyalty found only else in deep-rooted “real” religion and a 
person’s “powerful sense of the sacred” (Smith 2004, 26) it can be said to be an inheritor 
of pre-existing religious impulses (Smith 1993). In this way, though nationalism does not 
have the trappings of what we consider traditional religion; it can form a kind of secular, 
civil religion. Rather than temples and churches, its services are carried out in 
government buildings and monuments. As opposed to priests and rabbis, nationalism’s 
prophets are the political leaders who expound its supposed truths. This conception of 
nationalism as a civil religion elevates national citizens to the level of “chosen people” or 
“the elect” who have a divine right to possess territory (Smith 2004). In this way, quasi-
religious fervor drives the territorial demands of nationalist movements. 
Whereas theories of development such as Smith’s hold that the nationalist strains 
we see in modern society arise from a pre-existing ethnos, modernist theories situate 
nationalism in more recent past. Benedict Anderson describes nationalism as “imagined 
communities”, socially constructed entities imagined by the people who perceive 
themselves to be a part of the group (Anderson 1991). This idea is predicated in the fact 
that individuals will imagine themselves bonded across time and space with members of 
the “community” they have not even met. “The members of even the smallest nation will 
never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the 
minds of each lives the image of their communion” (1991, 6). Thus the term “imagined” 
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is used because there is not actually widespread interaction or communication between 
members of the nation; rather, it is an internalized community held together in the minds 
of the individuals who feel themselves a part of it. Anderson contends that this 
development is a modern phenomenon, directly traceable even to the development of the 
vernacular printing press, a literate population, and the accompanying easy dissemination 
of the written word (Anderson 1991). Through the dissemination of printed information 
in the vernacular, a common discourse emerged among various locales and dialects, 
standardizing communication. In this way the first modern nation-states emerged in 
Europe around “national print-languages”. 
Similarly, Hobsbawm (1992) takes a modernist approach and credits elites with 
fabricating the ideas behind national identities and traditions before foisting them on the 
lower rungs of society, aided as it were by these new methods of information sharing. 
Though taking a different tact than Anderson, Hobsbawm is nonetheless in sympathy 
with him because while he does focus on construction by elites, he still acknowledges 
nationalism’s less-than-natural roots. Rather than being the result of almost instinctive 
groupings based off ancient ethnies, “nations” are in fact entities created out of disparate 
ethno-linguistic groups and cultures, often only unified “by a lengthy process of violent 
conquest” (Hall et al. 1996, 616). The violence that unites disparate groups into a nation 
can be both physical violence, enacted through warfare, and a more ephemeral, almost 
psychological violence. In order for national unity to occur, the conglomerated entities 
must establish a new, hegemonic order at the expense of subverting many of the other, 
competing identities (Billig 1995; Hall et al. 1996; Hutchinson and Smith 1995; Alonso 
1994). This is often done through a campaign of inculcation in which new stories of 
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origin and national struggle are passed down to citizens as well as through the creation of 
symbols that signify the new nation and become widely recognizable (Billig 1995; Hall et 
al. 1996). In this somewhat intangible war of ideas and symbols, violence can be 
metaphorical as languages, cultural forms, memories, and norms, are destroyed and 
replaced by others. Simultaneously, though, it can be physical as people defending each 
identity position struggle with each other or as individuals seek to force linguistic or 
cultural minorities to assimilate – or else expel or relocate them. Indeed, the hegemonic 
power may even seek to reach into the private realm by outlawing private maintenance or 
observance of identity practices. We see such subjugating of competing identities 
particularly in nineteenth century Europe as national movements acted as “movements 
for national unification or expansion” (Hobsbawm 1992). Those territories and peoples 
integrated into new nation-states were expected to be “nationally homogeneous” and so 
had to adopt a new identity in order to emphasize unification. A sense of citizenship and 
belonging in the newly consolidated, “liberal” states was tied to adopting this new sense 
of identity which subverted any of those previously held by individuals (Hobsbawm 
1992). 
As nationalism seeks to subvert competing identities, it must also contend with 
resistance to homogenization from with the process. The logic of nationalism results in 
competing claims of peoplehood and sovereignty. This results in a lack of legitimacy for 
the central state and dominant nationalism, which can result in minority group struggles 
for autonomy or even secession. Thus, while nationalism is often seen as a unifying and 
homogenizing force (e.g. Billig 1995; Hall et al. 1996; Hobsbawm 1992) but it can also 
be seen as fragmenting as those subordinated in the new order begin to resist state 
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centralization and dominant nationalist policies. Furthermore, sub-state groups seeking 
recognition as a nation may transcend fixed territorial boundaries on a map and challenge 
sovereignty and integrity of not just a single state but multiple states through 
irrendentism. They present a challenge to the existing order of states with its rigidly 
imposed boundaries on territory by seeking defined boundaries of their own. By this 
token, attempting to develop a sense of national identity is both unifying and 
fragmentary. 
Banal nationalism and everyday flagging 
The modernist perspective emphasizes the everyday construction of national 
identity – that is the way nationalism is lived, practiced and internalized by the citizenry. 
Michael Billig uses the term “banal nationalism” to describe how national sentiment 
plays out in the everyday experience (1995). The idea of banal nationalism plays a central 
role in this project, which examines the role of language education and everyday 
language usage in youth identity formation. The idea of banal nationalism holds that 
minute details in everyday life reinforce a sense of national identity in an unconscious 
and ordinary, “taken-for-granted” manner; this applies to linguistic policies, which can 
subtly reinforce nationalist orientations, consciousness, and ways of thinking. 
Billig defines nationalism as “the ideological means by which nation-states are 
reproduced”(Billig 1995, 6). This hearkens back to Hobsbawm’s and Anderson’s 
arguments that nationalism and nation-building projects are modern developments, often 
pushed by elites. Nationalism is inherently political, and banal nationalism is a means of 
advancing political ideology, specifically that of the elites, attempting to push a particular 
agenda. Billig argues that rather than waning, habits of nationalist reproduction are 
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indicated or “flagged” in daily life. This means that the institution of a nation-state does 
not end the process of nation-building. Rather, the work continuously occurs through 
more subtle, perhaps even unintentional means. Again, in Billig’s words, “nationalism, 
far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition” 
(Billig 1995, 6). This endemic character is reflected in the actions, language, and 
symbolic displays which reinforce and naturalize national identity. Importantly, the 
constant reiteration of nationalism is unconscious when viewed by the citizen. Rather 
than obtrusive rallying cries, these elements of banal nationalism simply reflect a latent 
identity which is always present (Alonso 1994). In this way, Billig makes sure to 
differentiate between “the flag waved by Serbian ethnic cleansers and that hanging 
unobtrusively outside the US post office” (Billig 1995, 6). The internalized feelings of 
nationalism which are reinforced by Billig’s banal settings provides an opportunity to 
understand the “grass-roots” development of nationalism as opposed to that being 
promulgated by a top-down, state-centric hierarchy.  
The advancement of post-national identity and a European context 
 As we have seen, modernist definitions of nationalism emphasize that nation-
states and nationalist ideologies developed in Europe, especially in the nineteenth 
century. However, today we live in a world in which globalization is growing, the world 
is becoming more interconnected, and some argue the nation-state is decreasing in 
importance as transnational communication and transportation increase. These 
conversations about nationalism have come up against concurrent ideas of post-
nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and the like. These new ideas suggest new modes of 
identity, politics, and institutions that are not situated in or contained by nation-states and 
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historic senses of nationalism but rather transnational political institutions which 
increasingly have an impact on global affairs (Matuštík 1993; Holton 1998; Smith 2010).  
These “post-national” trends complicate the modernist conceptualization of nationalism 
and the nation-state by de-centering the role of the state from conversations of identity. 
In the case of País Vasco and Spain, much of this discussion takes place in the 
context of European integration under the auspices of the European Union. Since World 
War II, Europe has slowly been going through an integrative process. Initially begun as 
part of an effort to create economic stability among a select few states, the European 
project has come to encompass greater depth and breadth (Tiersky, Jones, and Genugten 
2011). As part of integration in the European Union, old ways of demarcating difference 
between states have been slowly disappearing as political integration began in the 1990s 
under the Maastrict Treaty and as proposals such as the Schengen Treaty insuring free 
movement between signatories came into force (Deflem and Pampel 1996; Soysal 1996). 
In addition, because of political integration in Europe, citizens of EU member states are 
granted EU citizenship, which complements their national citizenship. This grants 
citizens of the EU the right to move freely, to seek employment, and to seek aid and 
protection from EU institutions throughout the entirety of the Union (Tiersky, Jones, and 
Genugten 2011). This means that citizens of these states enact their citizenship rights not 
just at a nation-state level, but on multiple scales (Nagel 2011). Individuals, some 
suggest, are now more able to decouple themselves from a state-centric conception of 
identity because they are no longer tied to their “home” nation-state in defining their 
relationship to other Europeans (Smith 1992). Rather, by virtue of having multi-scalar 
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citizenship rights and practices, European citizens are now able assume a sense of 
European identity at the supranational level (Becher 1996; Deflem and Pampel 1996).  
 Some argue that this development of a “post-national” identity is a “natural” 
progression in Europe. Delanty (1995) says that “one of the most striking features of 
European identity is that the dynamics involved in its invention are not unlike the 
processes by which regional identities were superseded by national identities in the 
nineteenth century”, echoing opinions held by Becher (1996) and Smith (1992). He says 
that this identity, like that of nationality, was born out of adversity.  The adversity he 
refers to relates to the aftermath of World War II and the later the Cold War. The idea of 
post-national sentiment superseding national identity follows the model previously 
mentioned in which national identities supplant subnational ones. In order for national 
identity to be developed, competing visions of the nation must be suppressed by the 
dominant discourse (Billig 1995; Hall et al. 1996). In the same way, the development of 
post-national identity requires the suppression or at least pushing aside of identity tied to 
the nation-state, especially identities that have been historically problematic such as in 
the Balkans. This elevation of European identity is actively supported at the supranational 
level as the EU not only pushes for education on what it means to be a European citizen 
but as it enforces minimal standards for civil and minority rights, holding that these 
values are a “European” ideal (Wringe 1996; Deflem and Pampel 1996). However, it 
must be noted that not all commentators hold that a sense of European identity is 
constructed by these shared civil values. Some, such as Tony Judt (2005) in his 
comprehensive historical work, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, find an 
overarching European identity, while serving some sense of civil good, to be based in 
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economic terms. While wealth redistribution and economic legislation may be veiled in a 
curtain of civil improvement and citizenship, the very fact that this economic system 
exists may be seen as what ties Europeans together. Indeed, as will be discussed in later 
chapters, this idea of economic instrumentalism comes out in interviews with individuals 
in the Basque region, particularly in light of the current (2007-2013) economic crisis. 
Regardless, for those arguing that a European identity exists, there is evidence to 
support the view that it might undercut traditional nationalisms. The European 
Commission goes so far as to require states seeking accession to alter laws relating to 
everything from labor protections to voter rights in order to meet Union-held ideals if 
existing laws are seen as not being of high enough standard (European Commission 
1993). In order to enjoy the economic benefits of EU membership – the main reason 
many governments tout accession to their citizens – the EU requires acquiescence to its 
own views of what constitutes minimal standards of civil and minority protections 
(Tiersky, Jones, and Genugten 2011). For example, before the Romania and Bulgaria 
were allowed to accede in 2007, they had to agree to and adopt legal changes to come in 
line with the acquis communautaire, the body of European Union law composed of 
legislation and court decisions. Accession negotiations also included a period of 
monitoring by EU institutions which had to issue a final monitoring report confirming 
compliance in 2006 (European Commission 2002). This report not only listed written 
changes made to the legal code but also listed levels of implementation for problematic 
areas. EU directives in the acquis relating to issues ranging from  free movement of 
people to the protection of languages – the latter example resulting in the adoption of 
Cyrillic as a third official EU alphabet as part of Bulgaria’s accession. This all illustrates 
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a tension in the EU that exists between the desire to elevate and respect diversity – very 
much an ideal out of sync with “traditional” nationalism – and creating a sense of 
“Europeanness”. 
These many varied protections being offered as they are, the potential arises for 
the EU to be seen as the protector of subnational identities, language groups, and 
cultures, supporting them in what Urla (1988, 379) calls “the battle for cultural rights.” 
This is of particular importance for subnational groups such as the Basques who assert 
claims to national identity and effective sovereignty. It begins to be possible that regional 
nationalists groups who see the state hierarchy as oppressive will champion the cause of 
European integration and support its establishment over that of the state due to the 
Union’s insistence on recognizing and respecting diversity. There is an ironic tension 
here though because at the same time that the language of universalistic rights is being 
used to foster and protect regional identities in their struggle for recognition from the 
state, the Union also uses it to foist a program of “European” identity development on 
citizens. The Union pushes a program of European Citizenship Education (ECE) which 
can attempt to subvert more spatially circumscribed or limited senses of identity. 
Regardless of this fact though, nationalists may see championing the European cause as a 
positive action due to the insistence of European education initiatives that students learn 
more than one language (Wringe 1996). 
Moving on from discussions of national identity 
 From all of this discussion we arrive at three main points. First, the idea of a 
national identity and sovereign national homeland is a modern phenomenon; the creation 
of nationhood is a political project which seeks to orient itself as the dominant narrative 
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in an imagined community. Nationalism is directly tied to a sense of sacredness and the 
need to define territory. Sub-state nationalist and non-assimilationist undercut the 
dominant nationalisms and act against the state’s interests when they pursue their own 
nationalist agenda of resistance, establishing claims of autonomy, and territorial integrity. 
Second, once a nation-state has been established, it is constantly reified through a sense 
of banal nationalism as everyday experiences and articles become subconscious symbols 
reinforcing nationalist claims. This is a two-edged sword though because just as these 
things can subtly reinforce state power, they can also act in highly divided societies to 
undercut it. Lastly, especially in the European context, there is an ongoing debate about 
the development of post-national or European identities that seem to challenge the 
traditional form of nation-building. While the structures that are put in place to do this 
may weaken individual states and so be championed by sub-state nationalists, they may 
also be dangerous to those regional goals as the supranational seeks to smooth competing 
identities into a more general “European” concept. 
2.2: LANGUAGE, LINGUISTIC POLICIES, AND EDUCATION 
This section examines specifically the role of language in the process of nation-
building and how it might complicate post-national citizenship. Building on the 
modernist construction of nationalism, I will briefly examine the development of 
language and its importance in discussions of identity. Following that, it is important to 
cover the continued role of elites, specifically through the implementation of language 
policies and how these policies are enacted in educational settings (schools) through 
specific language education programs. Particular attention will be paid in this latter part 
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to the idea of language education as a way to integrate youths into a wider national 
framework. 
 Language is one of the major defining characteristics of “national culture” 
(Hobsbawm 1996). In fact, it “is often considered the most powerful mark of identity” 
(Kolossov 2003, 258). The rise of the modern nation-state is tied in with the rise of 
common vernacular languages and with the rise of printing (Anderson 1991; Billig 1995). 
Anderson’s “national-print languages” were vernaculars that arose out of uniform 
spelling and grammar that began to appear as books, pamphlets, circulars, and other 
printed materials began to be circulated. Prior to this, the language of the written word 
was Latin, which was taught and even then only to the elites (Murphy 1981; Billig 1995). 
The standardization of vernacular grammars and vocabularies came much later and rose 
as an academic discipline alongside the creation of a national literary canon during the 
Reformation and the development of the modern state in the eighteenth and into the 
nineteenth centuries. According to Foucault (1979, 206), this parallel development of 
structure in academia and society occurred in the context of a developing “disciplinary 
society” that gave rise to the modern system we know today which instituted 
standardized public schooling and the assimilation of regional languages. In this way, 
regulating language became important for elites who wished to impose some form of 
unified identity on a group. 
Regulation of language 
Anderson (as quoted in Oakes 2001, 20) states, “Language is not an instrument of 
exclusion: in principle, anyone can learn any language. On the contrary, it is 
fundamentally inclusive, limited only by the fatality of Babel: no one lives long enough 
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to learn all languages.” This naïve theorizing about language ignores its incredible 
capacity for exclusion. Vernacular languages were seen as a model for inclusion in new 
nation-building projects but like much else with nationalism were often a two-edged 
sword. The imposition of a vernacular requires the exclusion of other linguistic variations 
and these exclusionary practices then create divisions within societies which can have 
profound political consequences in a national arena. 
Regulation of languages can assume many different forms and hierarchies ranging 
from the classification of what counts as language down to the absolute right of usage. 
There is great power in the ability to regulate official language and to exclude, denigrate, 
and/or ban corrupted dialects.  It is also linked to racialized struggles and class struggles. 
In this way, Tuscan became the language of Italy while Piedmontese was demoted to the 
status of a mere dialect (Petrosino 1992). Even more drastically, the Turkish government 
maintains that there is no such thing as a Kurdish ethnicity of language, arguing that 
Kurdish people are isolated “mountain Turks” who have either forgotten their native, 
“Turkish” language or at best speak a corrupted version of it (Entessar 1989). Similarly 
drastic were bans on Timorese education following the Indonesian invasion of East 
Timor (Pilger 2010) and the nineteenth century bans on Welsh and Scots in the United 
Kingdom (Kiernan 1993). All of these are examples of the dominant group asserting 
linguistic dominance in the developing nation-state, giving further evidence of the 
constructed nature of the supposed nation through subversion of other identities and 
group traits. As Hobsbawm states, “Historically, the coexistence of peoples of different 
languages and cultures is normal; or, rather, nothing is less common than countries 
inhabited exclusively by people of a single uniform language and culture” (1996, 1068). 
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The ability to classify language in this way facilitates the exclusion of those 
groups who do not meet imposed standards even within the same language. Work by 
Vassberg (1993) and Paltridge and Giles (1984) in France showed exclusionary attitudes 
and practices within French conversation. Minority groups in these studies could be 
delineated not only by speaking ‘foreign’ languages but by speaking a ‘regional accent’. 
Paltridge and Giles in particular showed that there is not only a preferred accent in France 
but that a hierarchy of preferred-to-less-preferred accents has developed.  
When looking at the right of usage in discussing languages, we must examine the 
totality of language rights allowed in a society. These range from the ability to conduct 
government business in a certain language down to the legal allowance to even speak 
certain languages on street corners. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, today Spain does 
not – at least statutorily – have an issue with multilingualism. Rather, it is enshrined in 
the national curriculum standards that students will learn a “foreign” language before 
graduation. In addition, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 guarantees the protection of 
regional languages and the right of all citizens to learn and speak them (Urla 1988; Urla 
1993). Understanding this also illustrates the changing nature of nationalism and national 
identity in the European context. Rather than being a monolithic, hegemonic force, 
national identity can be understood today as a negotiated choice that is internalized in the 
individual. Instead of being imposed from a above, it is a shifting ideal affected by a 
variety of identity layers. 
Hobsbawm argues against the idea that modern nation-states instituted central 
language policies as a way to suppress competing “laterally bonded” identities of culture, 
ethnicity, or language. “The ideal of [a state] represented by an ethnically, culturally, and 
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linguistically homogeneous population…would have surprised the founders of the 
original nation-states. For them, the unity of the nation was political and not socio-
anthropological. It consisted in the decision of a sovereign people to live under common 
laws and a common constitution, irrespective of culture, language, and ethnic 
composition” (1996, 1066). This statement adopts the position that – at least originally – 
nation-states were to be formed with a sense of civic nationalism, ideals tied to 
institutions or philosophies rather than demographic groupings. He builds on this idea by 
further stating, “The original case for a standard language was entirely democratic, not 
cultural. How could citizens understand, let alone take part in, the government of their 
country if it was conducted in an incomprehensible language…Would this not guarantee 
government by an elite minority?” (1996, 1069). This argument is problematic. It 
assumes that centralized language policies enforcing a state-wide official tongue were an 
idealistic attempt born out of respect for citizens and the desire to more easily 
communicate with others. While there may have been a desire to more easily 
communicate amongst various regions, it was no egalitarian movement driven by 
optimistic democrats. Language policies may have been cloaked in this language but it 
would have only been a cloak. As discussed in the last section, nationalist movements at 
the state level in the nineteenth century were concerned with undercutting regional or 
local identities for the sake of the centralized hierarchy. Furthermore, Hobsbawm seems 
to ignore the fact that these language policies were often imposed by elites who chose to 
hold their own language as the standard. Rather than implicitly creating an elite minority 
by not educating the populace, these policies explicitly created marginalized languages – 
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and thereby groups – on the periphery of the state by favoring one at the expense of 
others. 
Language education 
Language education policies are emblematic of the regulatory practices which 
began to be put in place by the hegemonic powers in nation-states at the start of the 
modern era. On of the key sites of societal regulation was the emergence of public 
schooling in the nineteenth century. Gellner (2009) directly ties the rise of the nation-
state with this cultural transition which was itself tied to the imposition of a standardized 
‘national tongue’, education of which was overseen by the central state power. This is 
because “the educational system and the nation-state are strictly interdependent: one 
cannot exist without the other”(Kolossov 2003, 258). Standardized education and 
curriculum are then the markers of a centralized government. Similar to the way in which 
the printed word relies upon and allows for the standardization of language, centralized 
education systems help to standardize knowledge about state institutions and civic ideals. 
However, the way in which language policies have been enacted, especially in the 
educational arena, are not uniform. I have been discussing the way in which hegemonic 
powers may seek to dominate/eliminate other linguistic identities. It must be noted that 
this is not always the case. Especially in educational arenas, there can be a wide variance 
in language policies and the way they are enacted in the school. 
Taking all of this theoretical discussion of hegemonic language imposition into 
account, governments have nonetheless enacted multi-layered language policies for a 
variety of reasons. Nationalist education policies are typically concerned with 
standardization efforts. However, and especially in the context of the European Union, 
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elements at multilingualism appear. Though the historic reason for standardized 
education might have been centralization of power, these new policies reflect new and 
somewhat shifting ideals. These shifts again show the way in which national agendas are 
shifting from monolithic impositions. Some changes allow for the advancement of ethnic 
and national languages in an attempt to have disparate groups accept the governing 
regime. However, others policies may admittedly still be an attempt to impose the 
dominant language of the elites uniformly across the state’s territory, suppressing 
competitors. Regardless, policies regarding language and language education were and 
are instituted to further varying political agendas (Pavlenko 2008). In the European 
Union today, these policies are at least on paper the result of a desire to promote diversity 
and acknowledge regional differences. However, it must be noted that just because 
education is allowed in the non-dominant language of the state, minority languages are 
not necessarily any more privileged. That being said, “school-based linguistic 
revitalization represents a potentially powerful transformative effort” for marginalized or 
endangered languages (Brown 2012).  
New agendas today can advance a variety of ideals – encouraging the 
conceptualization of multiculturalism, simply respecting minority groups’ rights to speak 
in their mother tongue, or attempting to reinforce the dominant group’s hegemony 
through single-language school programs (Kymlicka 1995). In other cases, language 
education is today being pushed in schools around the world as a method of increasing 
capacity of citizens to interact in a global setting (Spring 2004). In idealized discourse of 
the European Union, multilingual fluency is seen as a way to promote communication 
and common understanding across the bloc. Citizens though often have a different 
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perspective, attributing multilingual fluency to economic aspirations, a concept to be 
explored later at greater depth in the case of the Basque region. Yet, multilingualism and 
multilingual education is not uniformly lauded internationally. In some countries 
multilingualism is seen as a positive attribute while in others it elicits controversy when 
not speaking in the dominant or official language is portrayed as undermining a singular 
and insularly focused, united nation (Pavlenko 2002; Pavlenko 2003). Even in states 
which do not have an official language, multilingual education outside of the dominant 
tongue can be controversial. This is illustrated in the United States by the dissention 
caused by language accommodation programs advocated for by Spanish-speaking 
Hispanic populations (Pogue 2003).  
 In examining the literature on language, three things become evident. First, 
language can be a central part of establishing the hegemonic power of one national group 
within the nation-state. In doing so, not only are other linguistic groups marginalized but 
the dominant power formalizes its own language, imposing a structure and order that can 
delineate and ostracize dialects. Second, this process is further evidence of and used in 
the modernist construction of many national identities in Europe, an important point for 
this case study. Third, language policies are often enacted in educational settings and can 
advance a variety of civic ideals in today’s world. Whatever ideal being promoted – 
multiculturalism, economic attractiveness, or even simple respect for cultural differences 
– these policies are imposed from the state and function as an expression of the state 
power. These educational policies target youth populations because it is the young people 
who are required through truancy laws to attend schools. As we consider the relationship 
 28 
between nationalism and language policies, we must then focus specifically on the 
relationship between these issues and young people’s budding sense of personal identity. 
2.3 YOUTH POPULATIONS 
 At the core of this project an attempt to understand the relationship between 
young people’s developing sense of national identity and language education policies in 
the Basque region. The modernist construction of nationalism sees national identity as 
constructed by elites and implemented in a top-down method. Of particular importance 
national political projects are education and linguistic policies. Billig’s ideas of banal 
nationalism in which everyday practices subconsciously affect and reify national identity 
suggest that a sense of identity is not merely imposed from above but is a shifting 
internalized process. Understanding this allows for one to examine how schools or other 
social spaces serve as spaces in which nation-building projects and language policies 
come together for young people. Young people, through their daily practices and 
developing sense of identity, must negotiate various political projects as they shape their 
sense of identity while coming of age in a democratic yet partially divided society. In this 
way youth populations serve as a lens through which to examine these nationalist projects 
from the bottom-up, evaluating the active choices individuals make when internalizing 
national projects. 
The potential for schools and educational policies to effect the development of 
national identity in youths is enormous. Current research indicates that “children as 
young as four years have nascent sense of nations and nationality, and even before 
entering formal education many can already identify differences between ‘us’ and 
‘them’” Hague (2001). Most of this early identification of nation and nationalities comes 
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from interactions with familiar and easily remembered images and stereotypes imparted 
by people – family, friends, schoolteachers – or media – television, film, posters. 
(Wiegand 1992). Wiegand (1992) refers to these items as “emblem images”, and his 
assertions about their role in forming early childhood conceptions of the nation reinforces 
the important role of national symbols as described by Billig (1995), Hall (1996), and 
Smith (2010).  Some developmental psychologists disagree with the idea of early 
childhood conceptions of nationalism, saying that spatial awareness develops only slowly 
and with age (Piaget, Inhelder, and others 1956). Regardless of this, by the time youth 
reach their teenage years, it is accepted that they are well on their way to shaping their 
senses of identity and affiliation. As Sutton (2009) says, “even young children are able to 
perceive and experience” social divisions and difference and this plays a large role in 
forming how they perceive themselves and those around them. 
However, children are not necessarily mere passive receptors of nationalist 
ideology and practices. During the teenage years, youth fill a grey area between 
childhood and adulthood. It is accepted that they have the ability to determine much of 
their own social interaction and yet are constitutionally still excluded from many of the 
privileges of citizenship (Weller 2003). This exclusion happens even in the face of 
developing notions in Europe of children being portrayed as “fellow citizens” (Kjørholt 
2007). They are in a position of informing their sense of belonging to the group while 
having few political rights which they can exercise independent of supervisory control, 
though as Nagel (2011, 121) points out, having a sense of belonging is “necessarily 
political”. This sense of belonging and identity becomes more important because of the 
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way that “social contingencies” frame the way they “construct…and feel ownership in 
their construction” of their lives (Brannen and Nilsen 2002). 
Because of their place in schools, language education policies are directed at 
young people. This is implicitly stated because they are the target of such measures by 
virtue of the fact that youths are the ones who actually sit in classrooms and receive 
instruction each day. It thus becomes important to investigate how these young people 
use language in their daily lives. Doing so allows us to evaluate how these young people 
relate to competing identity discourses and potentially internalize (or not, as the case may 
be) their message. Young people also serve as a new window through which the 
complexities of nationalism and post-nationalism can be examined due to the fact that 
affiliation with certain identities begins at a young age and occurs in some of the same 
spaces as those held by adults espousing nationalist discourse. However, children and 
youth experience these discourses in different ways than adults do (Leonard 2006a). 
Understanding how youth populations in País Vasco are navigating these discourses 
helps to understand the impact of language policies and the role that nationalist discourse 
plays in youth identity formation. This in turn helps to evaluate the effectiveness of 
nationalist policies in inculcating a sense of “being Basque” in future generations. The 
idea of inculcation – that attitudes, ideas, or values, are instilled through persistent yet not 
overbearing instruction – in schools again raises the specter of Billig’s banal nationalism. 
The question is raised in what way this persistence in language instruction subtly 
influences identity development or if it even does so at all? 
Understanding this “effectiveness” is important because of the possibility that 
youth may themselves “play” with various identities or discourses to the extent that they 
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themselves subvert or even reject competing nationalisms. Youth agency seems to be 
overlooked by nationalist projects which assume that hierarchical imposition will work to 
instill ideals. Studying it allows us to see if there is this sense of a choice in young people 
and how they negotiate internally and socially through such choice. Young people are 
also important to study not only because they represent the future of a society but because 
their stories are often eclipsed by adult narratives, particularly in societies riven by 
sectarian or partisan divisions (Leonard 2006b). This subversion again ignores the fact 
children have agency in national struggles (Habashi 2011). Ignoring this process means 
that we ignore providing additional depth to our understanding of national projects. 
In light of this literature, as well as that on language policies and the idea of post-
national identity in Europe, we are faced with the fact that youth have choices. As 
previously stated, various policies such as language education target them, but this does 
not necessarily mean it impacts them the way nationalists would hope. Chapter 5 
discusses this concept and what it potentially means for the cause of nationalism and 
national movements in Europe. 
2.4 MOVING OUT OF THE LITERATURE 
The youth of País Vasco are faced with a society in which there are active efforts 
to create and impose national projects. Language education policies play a major role in 
this. They must negotiate transforming their early childhood “emblem images” of nation 
into a coherent sense of identity while in a complex social setting that presents competing 
ideas on the subject to them from the earliest age. Faced with strident views from both 
the ardent, centralizing Spanish nationalist and the equally fervent, regional-based 
Basque nationalists, there is simultaneously a supranational entity in the form of the 
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European Union pushing for a sense of a unified European identity. From this literary and 
analytical foundation I will address issues of how different nation-building projects 
become meaningful to young people in the region and how schools or other social spaces 
serve as spaces in which nation-building projects and language policies come together for 
young people. This discussion will incorporate data collected from on-site interviews in 
the city of Bilbao, Spain. Before moving immediately into discussion and analysis of the 
empirical data, I will briefly describe in the next chapter the process of field work and the 
methods employed in this project. 
.
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
For this research I used a series of semi-structured interviews with parents, 
teachers, and secondary school students to elicit information about the ways they 
perceive and discuss issues of national identity, language education and daily language 
usage, and to ascertain the political significance of linguistic choices in País Vasco. 
Through these interviews I was able to elicit in-depth information from informants that 
provided “rich descriptions of complex phenomena” (Sofaer 1999, 1101). Rather than 
supplying potentially simplistic or limited responses that would come with methods such 
as surveying, interviews allowed me not only to receive more in-depth information 
immediately, but also flesh out deeper meanings and intents behind the comments made 
by informants. Given the complex nature of identity and associated daily choices such as 
language usage, the combined flexibility and depth of interviews provided a valuable data 
gathering tool. These interviews were supplemented by personal observation of specific 
areas of the city mentioned by informants as well as separate social excursions with 
student informants in order to provide firsthand context to gathered information. 
Secondary data collection of policy documents and general demographic information 
from  EU institutions, the Spanish government, and the regional government of País 
Vasco also occurred. This chapter discusses the design and implementation of this 
fieldwork and the reasoning behind the methodology used.
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3.1: RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS AND INTERVIEWS 
Prior to beginning fieldwork, I made initial contact with individuals at the Centro 
Internacional de Español (CIDE) at the University of Deusto in Bilbao. I had previously 
studied at Deusto during my undergraduate career through a program administered by 
CIDE. Using this personal connection, I solicited contact information for teachers to 
serve as initial contacts in school settings. I also made contact with professors who might 
allow me to make brief presentations to their classes at Deusto in order to solicit student 
informants. Of the initial four teacher contacts I made, two declined to participate in the 
study following my arrival on site. Of the other two, one allowed me to conduct a 
personal interview while the other assisted me in “snowballing” other contacts, both 
teachers and parents. I also used snowball sampling to contact additional potential student 
informants following initial solicitation in classrooms. Snowballing was used in large part 
because of its ability to “make use of natural social networks” in the study population 
(Noy 2008, 329). This not only allowed me to more easily approach potential informants, 
but because of the personal introductions also allowed for less stilted conversation from 
the beginning. This lessening of introductory formality makes it easier for informants to 
both trust the researcher and open up sooner and more fully in their responses. In order to 
limit the potential of my snowballing method to reproduce similarities in respondents, I 
sought out contacts with people who did not exactly replicate the same characteristics as 
other informants. For example, I asked for contacts with students from different high 
school language models while also balancing participants’ current post-secondary 
enrollment across both of the major universities in Bilbao. 
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I received Institutional Review Board approval from the University of South Carolina 
prior to meeting any potential informants in person. I specifically designed my project to 
protect the identities and confidentiality of my informants. Confidentiality was essential 
because potential issues discussed included those of political or ideological nature that 
could be controversial in the city and region. Conversations about Basque nationalism 
and support for nationalists can inevitably bring up issues regarding historical oppression, 
longstanding resentment, and feelings of marginalization. They can also touch on issues 
related to banned ultranationalist movements and groups deemed terrorists by the 
governments of Spain, the EU, and the United States. While these issues were not the 
central focus of my study, I nonetheless had to take them into consideration when 
designing my protocol. For these reasons I assured all of my informants of confidentiality 
when first meeting with them. Upon sitting down with each person, I presented with an 
informational letter inviting them to take part in my work, explaining the aims of the 
research, and explaining anonymity and confidentiality. Every informant was guaranteed 
verbally and in writing that I would use pseudonyms and would remove potentially 
identifying information from transcripts and final works. I emphasized the voluntary 
nature of this project and that I would not reveal sensitive information or illegal activities 
in my commentary. The on-site fieldwork for this project occurred over a period of seven 
weeks in the fall semester of 2012. During this time I conducted twenty-four semi-
structured interviews with students, teachers, and parents, each group of which is 
described here in turn. 
I met with nineteen students, speaking with ten individually, six of them in pairs, and one 
trio (see Table 2.1). For reasons relating to the sensitivities previously mentioned, as well 
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as to simplify the research process, I limited my contact to students who had reached the 
age of majority, which throughout Spain is eighteen. The students I interviewed ranged in 
age from 18 to 23. The majority of these students fell in the 18-20 age range, though 5 of 
them ranged from 21-23. I attempted to speak with University students in this younger 
age band so as to garner feedback from individuals as closely located to high school 
leaving age as possible. This had a dual advantage. First students closer to this age are 
likely to remember their earlier education more vividly with all of the attendant emotions 
and attitudes. Second, concentrating on the lower age band focused interviews on 
students who were most recently beginning to negotiate the rights associated with coming 
of age such as democratic participation and voting. This is important because this is the 
point at which young people are able to assert societal membership and develop a sense 
of political consciousness and belonging. All of the students I interviewed attended either 
the University of Deusto or the University of País Vasco (UPV). Deusto is a private 
university sited near the city center while UPV is the Vizcayan branch of the País Vasco 
public university system. Student interviews were semi-structured in nature and asked 
participants to reflect on their secondary school experiences after (generally) one to three 
years distance. A few main questions helped guide the course of the discussion I had with 
each participant, but I allowed for flexibility in the conversation so that particularly 
interesting points or tangents could be explored more fully as needed. 
Table 2.1: Student informants 
Code Pseudonym Age Gender 
Interview 
Session 
University 
School 
Type 
S1 Udane 22 F 
IS1 
 
Deusto Ikastola 
S2 June 22 F Deusto Ikastola 
S3 Irati 21 F Deusto Ikastola 
S4 Nahia 18 F 
IS2 
Deusto D 
S5 Iker 19 M Deusto D 
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S6 Oier 18 M 
IS3 
Deusto D 
S7 Unai 20 M Deusto B 
S8 Markel 18 M 
IS4 
UPV A 
S9 Uxue 19 F UPV D 
S10 Adere 21 F IS5 Deusto Ikastola 
S11 Naroa 20 F IS6 Deusto D 
S12 Leire 20 F IS7 Deusto D 
S13 Jon 19 M IS8 Deusto B 
S14 Ander 20 M IS9 Deusto B 
S15 Mikel 23 M IS10 UPV A 
S16 Eneko 19 M IS11 UPV A 
S17 Paula 19 F IS12 UPV D 
S18 Aiala 20 F IS13 UPV D 
S19 Nora 20 F IS14 UPV B 
 
Seven teachers participated in interviews with me, five of them individually and two as a 
pair (see Table 2.2). All together they represented five different schools in Bilbao and its 
surrounding environs. I was also unable to have direct access to classroom observation in 
schools associated with my teacher informants because of bureaucratic processes that 
were unresolved by the point that I was to return to the United States. However, my 
informants did agree to meet with me elsewhere and talk about their daily work 
experience. Two of these teachers came from the private ikastola system while the other 
five worked in public schools. Four of these public teachers work in D-model schools 
emphasizing Euskara education while the other teacher works in an A-model school. The 
fact that I did not interview a teacher working in a B-model school is primarily a 
shortcoming of the snowball strategy of informant contact as well as the limited amount 
of time that I was in the field. In this way my work, especially with teachers, cannot be 
said to be representative of all facets of Basque education but it nonetheless provides 
insight into the work teachers do and the attitudes they display in the classroom on a daily 
basis. As with students, teacher interviews were semi-structured. A few main questions 
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helped guide the course of the discussion I had with each participant, but flexibility 
abounded. Generally these questions were fairly similar to those asked of students but 
were approached from a slightly different perspective. 
Table 2.2: Teacher informants 
Code Pseudonym Gender 
Interview 
Session 
School 
Type 
T1 Maialen F 
IT1 
D 
T2 Ainhoa F D 
T3 Juana F IT2 ikastola 
T4 Aimar M IT3 A 
T5 Agirre F IT4 D 
T6 Izaro F IT5 ikastola 
T7 Carlos M IT6 D 
 
I was also able to interview five parents (see Table 2.3). Of these, one interview 
was with a mother-father pair while three other mothers spoke to me individually. All but 
one of the parents interviewed were contacted through their children that were also 
research participants. I took care to interview each parent away from his/her 
son/daughter. This allowed me to elicit different viewpoints from each type of informant 
without the pressure or influence of the other being present in the room. I also 
interviewed one mother who had no children participating in my project. However, of her 
three children, one is currently in high school. Contact with this mother was made 
through a teacher in her child’s school whom I had already interviewed. Parental 
interviews tended to be the shortest of all interviews and therefore had a correspondingly 
shorter list of questions to guide the interview. 
Table 2.3 Parent informants 
Cod
e 
Pseudonym 
# of 
Childre
n 
Gende
r 
Interview 
Session 
Associated 
Student 
P1 Xabi 
2 
M 
IP1 S12 Leire 
P2 Lucía F 
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P3 Begoña 3 F IP2 - 
P4 Itziar 2 F IP3 S16 Eneko 
P5 Ane 3 F IP4 S18 Nora 
 
All but three of these interviews were conducted in a majority of English with 
Spanish asides made as needed to clarify questions for participants or answers for the 
interviewer. As the interviewer, I am conversant in Spanish and comfortable speaking in 
the language as I studied in as part of my undergraduate program of study. Furthermore, I 
underwent language remediation and training during the summer prior to field work to 
solidify comfort with Castilian. The offer was made to all participants to conduct the 
interview in either English or Castilian. Those participants who spoke in English did so 
because they were all at least conversational in the language and stated that they felt 
comfortable using it. Of the interviews conducted in Spanish, one was with a student 
(S16 – Eneko) who admitted that his grasp of English was faulty and would be a 
hindrance to the process. The other two interviews were with parents (P3 – Begoña and 
P4 – Itziar) who knew only random phrases at best in English. Incidentally, one of these 
parents was also the mother of the student needing an interview in Spanish. These three 
interviews were assisted by a university student studying linguistics who served as 
needed as a translator. Recommended by professorial contacts, she was certified as being 
fully fluent in Castilian, Euskara, and English, as well as conversational in French. 
Additional information including statistical and demographic data regarding language 
usage, fluency, and education was collected from publicly accessible government 
databases. This information included the levels of fluency in Euskara and Castilian over 
time and the number of children enrolled in each school model. The primary source for 
this information was the Basque Department of Education, Language Policy, and Culture. 
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I also supplemented my interview data with limited participant observation and informal 
surveys of neighborhoods and areas mentioned to me in interviews. I was able to watch 
participants interact with others around them as well as explore the visual and auditory 
cues constantly swirling around them in the city. Observation centered on traveling 
through the city with informants as well as going on three separate evening social 
excursions with student informants. This direct observation of participants was limited by 
the amount of time I was able to spend in Bilbao. My informal surveys of neighborhoods 
and city districts consisted of walking “tours” I took each day. These personal 
observations were intended to both provide context to interview information as well as 
help me generate more nuanced questions for participants. In addition to these informal 
observations, I was able to attend two separate mass rallies while in Bilbao. Though these 
were related to rising unemployment and other economic woes in Spain, they also helped 
provide additional context for information that came up in several interviews. As will be 
discussed in a later chapter, this knowledge of the wider economic issues swirling in 
Spain is necessary in order to properly couch interview data in the proper temporal 
context. 
3.2: ANALYSIS 
 Using a series of semi-structured interviews with students, teachers, and parents, I 
was able to elicit information from each group with a slightly different perspective. This 
information covered a variety of interrelated topics such as school choice, school policies, 
interactions between each of the three groups, and daily usage of language and the social 
negotiations that accompany it. I supplemented information from interviews with 
personal observations in the city of Bilbao in order to provide a deeper layering of 
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context to the information I gathered. From all of this I was able to garner a large amount 
of information regarding language usage, education, and identity development in youth 
populations. 
 I transcribed each of the interview sessions upon the end of my field work. Using 
basic word processing software, I typed out each conversation, anonymizing each 
participant’s information as I went. Following this, I took printed transcripts and began to 
code them, searching for key themes, phrases or ideas that stood out. I also took part of 
this time to go through my own field notes and organize observational data on the basis 
of date and theme. As I began to discern general trends in the information before me, I 
also began to compare how different groups’ data compared with each other – teachers, 
parents, and students all against each other as well as between different school models. 
While developing these themes I also made note to find particularly relevant excerpts that 
could be quoted here to provide context and examples of the argument I make. 
 It needs to be noted that there are limitations to this data. The informants for this 
project characterize a limited subset of the people in Bilbao and País Vasco and are not 
empirically representative of the entire population. The students in particular come from 
a fairly homogeneous middle-class socio-economic background and all are in process of 
becoming highly educated. Furthermore, all but three of my informants were not only 
fluent in both Castilian and Euskara but also spoke English with a high degree of fluency. 
Some were even conversational in additional languages. This then presented little 
representation of the social and educational diversity present in Bilbao. However, this 
sample is nonetheless helpful in illustrating the complexities of competing identities, 
language usage, and the lack of a straightforward relationship between educational goals 
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and youth identities. Even within the relatively homogenous sample provided here, there 
is a wide disparity in perceptions, actions, and reasonings. It is also an interesting sample 
to examine because these individuals represent the highly educated, multilingual citizens 
that academic tracks in the Basque education system seek to mold. Rather than showing 
homogeneity in thought, these informants illustrate how even individuals who on paper 
meet similar socio-economic and educational criteria come to differing conclusions when 
wrestling with these issues. This status as model students is also useful when examining 
the issues of identity from the European level because they also represent the 
multilingual, well-educated European citizens that Brussels’ policies seek to encourage. 
Because of these reasons, the apparent homogeneity of informants is not necessarily 
harmful to this project even though it must be acknowledged including the potential 
limiting aspects of it. 
This data will be discussed at greater length in Chapter IV. However, before that and to 
place the accompanying analysis within its proper context for the reader, the next chapter 
will briefly discuss the history of the Basque people and nationalist movements, the 
development of Euskara, and the development and current status of the education system 
in País Vasco. 
3.3 TERMINOLOGY 
As is discussed repeatedly throughout this thesis, issues surrounding language can 
be much politicized in the Basque areas of Spain. Even the terminology used in a project 
like mine can relay implicit meanings, however unintentional they may be. For this 
reason I must be explicit that the non-English terminology I use – except where included 
in direct quotes from informants – is chosen for the sake of internal clarity, consistency, 
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and delineation. The intent on my part is not political. For example, since even the names 
of languages themselves can be contentious, I choose to refer to them by their regional 
names solely for the purpose of differentiation. In this way, “Spanish” as we know it in 
the United States is termed Castilian (sometimes referred to as castellano by informants) 
while the Basque language is termed Euskara. In the latter case this also has the easy 
benefit of differentiating between the Basque language and the Basque people in that the 
unqualified “Basque” will refer only to the people group. 
Other terminology choices are slightly more capricious but tend to favor Castilian 
terms simply because of my own familiarity with the language. For example, the 
Autonomous Community in which the city of Bilbao is referred to here as País Vasco 
simply because that is how I was first introduced to it. I similarly use the Castilian names 
for cities and provinces because they are the terms most likely to be familiar to the 
American audience. In the case of discussing the type of school with which individuals 
are affiliated, I use the standard descriptors of A- and B-models. However, while the 
terms “D-model” and “ikastola” are oftentimes colloquially interchangeable in Bilbao, I 
differentiate between the two terms. D-model in the context of this project specifically 
refers to public schools that use the Euskara-dominant curriculum while ikastola refers to 
those private schools operated on D-model lines. More distinct differences between the 
two systems are in Chapter 3..
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CHAPTER 4 
BACKGROUND CONTEXT 
 In order to discuss the identities of young people in País Vasco and the 
role of the education system in shaping these identities through language curricula, it is 
first necessary to ground this project in historical context. This chapter grounds this 
discussion in the history of the Basque nationalism and the relationship between the 
Basques and the modern Spanish state, as well as the European Union. Particular 
attention will be paid to the modern history of nationalist movements in the region. This 
historically recent development of Basque national identity and nationalist separatist 
movements reflects the modernist viewpoint discussed in Chapter I. The second section 
features a short discussion of the development of Euskara as a language and the 
modernization and standardization it has undergone in the last century. It also covers the 
formalization of the education system in País Vasco along its current three-track system 
in which school enrollment is predicated on placing students in one of three language 
models. The system of private ikastola schools is also discussed. Taken all together, this 
chapter illustrates the way in which Basque nationalism and nationalist policies have 
been shaped by the relationship with the Spanish state and the historic back-and-forth 
transitions between centralization and decentralization. 
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4.1: HISTORY OF THE BASQUE PEOPLE AND  NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS 
 The region inhabited by “Basque people” skirts the coastal regions of northern 
Spain and southern France on the edge of the Bay of Biscay (see Figure 4.1). The 
traditional territory forming Euskal Herria, roughly translated as “Basque Country”, is 
split into seven provinces, four in Spain and three in France (Heiberg 2007). Within 
Spain, four provinces are split between two Autonomous Communities, the first-level 
political division in that country. The first Community, País Vasco/Euskadi, is made up 
of the provinces of Álava/Araba, Vizcaya/Bizkaia, and Guipúzcoa/Gipuzkoa. The second 
Community, Navarra/Nafarroa, is a uni-provincial entity named after the historic region 
over which it is delineated. Located in France, the three northern provinces – Basse-
Navarre/Nafarroa Beherea, Labourd/Lapurdi), and Soule/Zuberoa – form the western part 
of the French department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques. Though historically part of the greater 
region, they were gradually and formally split from their Spanish counterparts by the 
French-Spanish border as dynastic successions and various wars formalized that 
boundary throughout the Middle Ages and the early modern period. These three French 
provinces feature prominently in nationalist-separatist imagery espousing the unification 
of the entire historic region as a single, independent political entity, but otherwise have 
little bearing on this project. 
Linguistically, the Basque people are identified with Euskara, a singularly unique 
tongue. A language isolate, it is unrelated to any other language in the world. Theories as 
to its age and origins proliferate in linguistic studies. It is possibly the oldest language 
spoken in Europe. Origin theories posited over the last few centuries include everything 
from Basque people being one of the Lost Ten Tribes of Israel to their being descendants 
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of Neanderthals. Less sensational theories have suggested that Euskara, and the Basques 
themselves, could be related to other semi-isolate groups in Europe such as the Finno-
Ugric languages of Finnish, Hungarian, and Estonian. The most recent theory to emerge 
about Euskara’s origins was published in early 2013 by Spanish academic Jaime Martín 
(Ediciones 2013) suggests that it is closely related to the Dogon tribal language of 
northen Mali. However, most linguists maintain that Euskara does in fact represent a 
language group predating the development of Indo-European languages into Western 
Europe, of which all other branches have been extinct for the length of recorded history 
(Kurlansky 2001). This uniqueness then, and the language’s perceived longevity, helps 
make it the leading marker for Basque culture and identity. 
 
  Figure 4.1: Basque provinces in Spain and France 
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The first written historical reference we have of the people inhabiting the Basque 
reigon is from the Roman historian Strabo who referred to them as Vascones (Heiberg 
2007). Before this time, there was no central authority in the region, nor was there a 
standardized Basque language such as we consider Euskara to be today. Rather, varying 
tribes and villages spread throughout mountains and valleys speaking wide array of 
related dialects. While inland tribes were mostly small farmers and herders, settlements 
along the coast were well-established communities engaged in extensive maritime 
commerce. Archeological finds provide evidence of ocean-going vessels capable of 
sailing not only along the Biscayan coast but also southward around the Iberian Peninsula 
and into the Mediterranean and northward as far as the North Sea. Indeed, there is some 
evidence to suggest that Basque fisherman were by this time already harvesting cod off 
the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, though records of such activity do not exist until the 
fifteenth century (Collins 1990). Roman armies reached the region under Pompey in the 
first century BCE. The Romans arranged the Basque tribes’ recognition of Roman 
suzerainty in return for regional semi-autonomy in which free movement of troops and 
goods was allowed through their land. This level of relative autonomy mirrored later, 
similar methods of regional governance and helped create a myth of an unconquered 
people (Mansvelt-Beck 2005). Basque provinces were not subject to the Roman legal 
code but instead were able to govern using their own traditional laws (Collins 1990). 
Later centuries featured the Basque provinces sitting astride the boundary of 
warring Visigoth and Frankish empires, conversion to Christianity, and helping to repel 
Moorish invasions of the Peninsula (Kurlansky 2001). The later medieval period also 
witnessed the emergence of history’s only Basque-dominated independent state in the 
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form of the Kingdom of Navarra (Heiberg 2007). The year 1179 marked the annexation 
of the region to the medieval kingdom of Castilla (Heiberg 2007). This is historically 
extremely important for two reasons. First, the region that is today País Vasco was 
subdivided into the three provinces of Álava, Vizcaya, and Guipúzcoa (Kurlansky 2001). 
However, and second, the region was granted wide-ranging autonomy under Castilian 
rule, with the right to continue governance under the fueros – roughly translated as 
Charters or traditional laws – which the Castilian king swore to honor. This practice 
would continue consistently through state and dynastic changes until the mid-nineteenth 
century, and the abolishment of the fueros would be a major spark in early development 
of Basque nationalist movements (Kurlansky 2001; Heiberg 2007). 
In 1492, Ferdinand of Aragón and Isabella of Castilla completed the Reconquista 
of Spain. Marrying in 1469, they united the crowns of the two kingdoms and so brought 
into being the formation of the modern Kingdom of Spain. Isabella brought with her 
territory the western part of the Iberian Basque region that is today País Vasco, and 
following her death in 1512 Ferdinand invaded the eastern half, the remnants of the 
Kingdom of Navarra. Fighting off Navarrese attempts from the northern side of the 
Pyrenees to regain their territory, the totality of what is now Spanish Basque country was 
united under one crown with the rest of modern Spain (Collins 1990; Heiberg 2007; 
Kurlansky 2001). Following the unification of Spain, the Basque regions were still 
granted the right to their fueros, but other symbols of autonomy were spasmodically 
granted and taken away. 
Following Spanish unification, individual cities in the region became trade and 
transportation hubs, particularly Bilbao. This provided economic stability amidst the 
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inflation in Spain caused by the influx of gold from the New World (Kurlansky 2001). 
During the Napoleonic Wars, many in the region joined forces with the British Army as it 
marched north into France as part of the peninsular campaign. Following the restoration 
of the Spanish monarchy after the Napoleonic wars, Ferdinand VII revoked liberal 
reforms put in place during his exile. The resulting civil war and later Carlist Wars over 
succession led to a spiral of destabilization in Spain (Kurlansky 2001; Heiberg 2007). In 
1873, the First Spanish Republic was proclaimed but dissolved in a little less than two 
years. Following this, Madrid attempted to centralize control of the country and the 
fueros were formally abolished in 1876, spawning discontent that would begin to 
coalesce around the burgeoning notions of Basque nationalism (Facaros and Pauls 2008; 
Atienza 2006). At the same time, rapid industrialization in Vizcaya fueled a demand for 
workers and outside groups began to immigrate to the Basque regions (Heiberg 2007). 
During the late nineteenth century Basque nationalists gained formal strcture with the 
founding of the first nationalist political party, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Heiberg 
2007; Atienza 2006). 
In 1933, the monarchy was once again formally abolished and the Second Spanish 
Republic was declared (Watson 2008). Socialist-leaning Republicans adopted a strategy 
of regional appeasement and autonomy that granted special status to the Basque regions, 
as well of those of Catalonia and Galicia (Shafir 1995). After only three year, the Spanish 
Civil War broke out as Francisco Franco fought against the Republic. The Civil War 
complicated issues of Basque unity and identity expression as the provinces of Vizcaya 
and Guipuzkoa  sided with the Republican forces while Araba and Navarra cast their lots 
with Franco (Kurlansky 2001). Both during the war and immediately following it, those 
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Basque areas which sided against Franco’s Nationalist forces were subjected to political 
and cultural oppression from the right-wing movement. With his eventual selection as 
Generalísimo of the Nationalist armies, Franco was also able to succeed as head of state 
following the death of Emilio Mola in 1937 (Clark 1979). From the outset of Franco’s 
time in power, there was a violent backlash against him. Initially this was seen in the 
form of the Spanish maquis, Republican soldiers who took to the mountains of northern 
Spain and waged irregular combat with Nationalist soldiers until the early 1950’s. The 
backlash against the Francoist government coincided with the maturation of factions in 
the Basque nationalist movement embracing violence, even terrorism, as a legitimate 
form of resistance. This was particularly true those advocating for complete secession 
from the Spanish state (Watson 2008). Though not all Basques nationalist groups 
embraced calls for independence, Francoist oppression increased sympathy the 
secessionist movement. 
Organized and armed nationalist resistance to the Franco regime in the Basque 
region came in the form of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom, 
ETA) in 1952 (Watson 2008). Created initially as a student discussion group at the 
University of Deusto in Bilbao, the group was reconstituted as ETA in 1959 (Clark 
1990). By the time of ETA’s founding, many nationalists were not calling for mere 
autonomy but actual separation from Spain. In addition, they promoted the mutilation of 
“Spanish” symbols displayed in public such as the flag of El Estado España – the 
Spanish State – and the national coat of arms that had been created by Franco. Members 
also began to distribute and clandestinely to hang the Ikurriña, the flag of Basque 
nationalism, in public places and to graffiti historic Basque emblems throughout major 
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cities (Hualde, Lakarra, and Trask 1995). There was also a clandestine movement to 
preserve Euskara communication since part of Franco’s “One Spain” policy was to 
suppress regional languages in the face of the “true” Spanish language, Castilian (Watson 
2008). Direct violence against individuals began in 1968 (Clark 1990). The resulting 
arrests and executions of ETA members were used by hardline Basque nationalists as 
justification for further attacks including the 1973 bombing that claimed the life of 
Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s Prime Minister and presumed successor (Forest 
1975). By targeting such an important and entrenched member of the regime, the goal of 
the attack was to induce “a spiral of violence” that would destabilize Spain and increase 
Franco’s oppressive policies toward the Basque people. This would in turn push the 
average person to pursue independence as the lesser of two evils when compared with the 
Francoist regime (Juaristi 2000). Ultimately this did not occur, but it did ensure the 
accession of Juan Carlos I to the throne of Spain from which he pushed for democratic 
reform. 
Following Franco’s death in 1975, the Spanish government began a slow 
transition away from totalitarianism to a democratically elected representative 
government (Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010).
 
A draft Constitution was then approved 
by the Spanish Cortes in October 1978, and by the Spanish citizenry on December 6, 
1978. It went into effect December 29 of that same year (Mansvelt-Beck 2005). One of 
the core pillars of this new document was the creation and recognition of Autonomous 
Communities. Section 2 of the Preliminary Title of the Constitution states, “The 
Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and 
indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-
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government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity 
among them all” (emphasis added). Thereafter, in Section 1 of Article 143, it reads, “In 
the exercise of the right to self-government recognized in Article 2 of the Constitution, 
bordering provinces with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics, island 
territories and provinces with historic regional status may accede to self-government and 
form Autonomous Communities in conformity with the provisions contained in this Title 
and in the respective Statutes.” This meant that the new Autonomous Community of País 
Vasco was quickly formed by its three constituent regions of Álava, Vizcaya, and 
Guipúzcoa. País Vasco has been able to gain the greatest deal of autonomy of any 
Community within the wider Spanish state (Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010). Navarra 
stayed a separate  Community based on an “update and improvement” of its traditional 
fueros, which had managed to survive even the machinations of the Francoist regime due 
to support for Nationalist forces during the Civil War (Clark 1979). 
The Statute of Autonomy granted to País Vasco came quickly after the 
promulgation of the Constitution, partly in an effort to diffuse secessionists (Clark 1990).  
However, ETA attacks were actually at their highest levels in terms of casualties and the 
group was slowly but surely becoming more radicalized during the 1980s. Coinciding 
with this was the revelation that the paramilitary Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación 
(GAL), had begun to kidnap, torture, and kill ETA members, as well as those possibly 
related to or supporting them (Woodworth 2001). GAL was responsible for 28 known 
murders between 1983 and 1987, with several others tied to them. The scandal that 
erupted in the early 1990’s when GAL was found to have state ties further radicalized 
ETA and bred distrust of the central government. While sympathy for the organization 
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began to rise, moderate nationalists still dominated the political scene. Herri Batasuna, 
ETA’s political wing, enjoyed significant minority support in the region even though it 
was the only Basque political party not to sign a 1988 pact supporting the end of ETA 
violence (Bew, Frampton, and Gurruchaga 2009). 
Nationalist parties have played a decisive role in the make-up of the regional 
assembly and the composition of coalition governments. So strong have they been that 
every government in País Vasco formed from 1980 until the 2009 election was 
dominated by a PNV executive. While moderate nationalists during this time came to 
accept the status quo of far-reaching regional autonomy, hardliners continued to maintain 
that the Basque people were the only people with the right to make decisions about the 
future of the region. They also demanded that all members past and present of ETA be 
granted amnesty, and called for respect “for the results of the democratic process in the 
Basque Country” with regards to independence referenda (Bew, Frampton, and 
Gurruchaga 2009). 
In 2001the Lehendakari (President of País Vasco) Juan José Ibarretxe offered up a 
plan to increase devolution of power to the Basque government, to separate the Basque 
judicial system from the greater Spanish one, and to strip of the central government’s 
right to suspend the regional government’s power. This plan was shot down by a 29-313-
2 margin in the Spanish Cortes. Similarly, a 2008 referendum asking voters if they 
supported “that the Basque parties, without exceptions, start a process of negotiation to 
reach a democratic agreement about the right to decide of the Basque People”, was 
suppressed by the Spanish Constitutional Court. Since this brief resurgence of mainline 
calls for greater independence, however, the politics of nationalist parties have for the 
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most part returned to their traditional moderate stances. Meanwhile, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court banned hardline parties affiliated with ETA beginning in 
2002(Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010). Organizations that the Spanish courts have 
determined to merely be reconstituted forms of the original groups under new names 
have subsequently been banned as well. In September 2010 ETA declared a ceasefire, 
further stating in January 2011 that it is “permanent”, formally renouncing violence in 
late 2012. Though not admitted by the group, the general consensus is that the reason 
behind this capitulation has been the increased pressure placed on it in recent years with 
the continual turnaround in leadership due to arrests. 
4.2: DEVELOPMENT OF EUSKARA AND LANGUAGE EDUCATION TODAY 
As previously mentioned, Euskara as a language is seen as the marker which 
defines being Basque. Though Basque people are sometimes described as slightly shorter 
with a swarthy complexion and darker hair than the stereotypical image of someone from 
Spain, visual or physiological differences are not really what defines “being Basque”. 
Rather it is the shared heritage of a culture and region that is marked by a unique 
language. This is of particular note because while there have been historic descriptions of 
the “Basque tongue”, Euskara has not been a unified language until the last few decades. 
Historically there have been up to anywhere from six to nine historic dialects recognized 
and even today there are five main dialects (Zuazo 2010). These modern divisions arose 
in the Middle Ages due to separation of various administrative regions as previously 
mentioned (Elissalt 1981; Zuazo 2010). This multi-faceted language is made more 
complex by the fact that these can subdivided into eleven sub-dialects which can 
themselves be subdivided into twenty-four minor varieties. This becomes problematic for 
 55 
a nationalist movement identified by language. Though all of these sub-dialects and 
minor varieties are indeed in the same family, they can be mutually unintelligible. 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, as the Basque national movements 
gained momentum, there were calls to preserve and standardize the language of Euskara 
(Zalbide n.d.). A language instate called the Euskaltzaindia was established in 1918 to 
oversee language development and conventions. Later given royal patronage, it is a Royal 
Academy on par with that for Castilian, the Real Academia Española. Over the next two 
decades, literary works – both fiction and nonfiction – in Euskara began to flourish. 
However, this production ceased almost completely and abruptly with the end of the Civil 
War (Gardner 2008). The Franco regime suppressed the language as it did not meet his 
ideals of a unified Spain, though this suppression was not uniformly enforced. The 
provinces of Vizcaya and Guipukoa were targeted more heavily than Navarra or Araba 
since they had fought against Franco. However, Araba and Navarra also had smaller 
Euskara speaking populations and so the process was not as disruptive. Indeed, even 
today Araba has the smallest Euskara speaking population per capita of all of the historic 
Basque provinces. Following the return to democracy though, suppression was halted and 
Euskara was given legal protection and co-official status in País Vasco. The 1979 Statute 
of Autonomy granted wide-ranging powers and protections to Euskara and movement 
towards extensive language education programs was begun(Gardner 2008). Prior to this, 
in 1976, the Euskaltzaindia had commissioned a wide-ranging report on the situation of 
Euskara. That report’s information on the status of the language, and one chapter in 
particular on the preparedness of teachers to instruct in it, was extremely influential in the 
structuring of the education system. 
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Because of existence of multiple dialects throughout the region, standardization 
efforts begun in the early twentieth century were continued under government 
sponsorship in order to create an “official” dialect. This movement culminated in 
“Euskara Batua” or Standardized Euskara. Based heavily on Guipukoan – in large part 
because this province had the highest concentration of Euskara fluency – with influences 
from other regional dialects, this is the Euskara form used in official mediums – 
education, government documents, signage, etc. However, there were many emotional 
debates surrounding standardization. Urla (1993) chronicles these debates, especially as 
they concern the question of modernity. Cited by Urla, the Basque philosopher Miguel de 
Unamuno (1864-1936) had argued that Euskara was a primitive language and that it 
constituted “a grave obstacle to the spread of European culture in [our] country” (1993, 
105). He and other academics argued that Euskara was too primitive and had too long 
been isolated from the languages of science, business, and culture to be relevant in the 
modern age. In fact, they went so far as to argue for the continued dominance of 
Castilian. However, preservationists ultimately won out, Batua became formalized, and 
the new Basque government began to construct the three-model education system we see 
today. 
País Vasco is officially bilingual, and the education system in the region reflects 
this by instituting three different tracks or models of schools. A-model is a Castilian 
model in which Euskara language and literature is also a compulsory subject. B-model is 
a dual-language mixed system in which primary instruction occurs in both languages 
based on the classroom and subject. Finally, D-model is Euskara dominant with Castilian 
language and literature as a compulsory subject(Aldekoa and Gardner 2002; Gardner and 
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Zalbide 2005; Gardner 2002a; Gardner 2002b). Parents in the region have the absolute 
right to determine which school model their children enter and the primary language used 
in their education. “Models A and B were originally intended for children from Spanish-
speaking homes, while D was for children from Basque-speaking homes. Model D, 
however, was from the start also popular with Spanish-speaking parents” (Gardner 
2002b, 7). There is not widespread agreement in the literature as to why parents 
necessarily pick the school model that they do; however, this will be discussed in the 
following chapter in light of my research findings. Aldekoa and Gardner (2002) and 
Gardner (2002b) do however show that the number of children enrolled in D-model, and 
B-model to an extent, have increased in the last three decades while the number in A-
model has shrunk. Gardner (2002b) posits that this is because as parents came to see D-
model and/or bilingual instruction as “stable” with enough teachers competent in the 
language and immersion instruction as a valuable experience. 
In addition to the public school system, there is also a variety of private schools in 
País Vasco. It must be noted that these schools, while private, still receive state support in 
the form of per-student monetary grants. However, parents do still pay fees of varying 
sizes for their children’s enrollment. These private schools fall into two main camps: 
religious schools and ikastolas. Religious schools are typically operated by the Roman 
Catholic Church. These religious schools do not feature in this project and so are 
mentioned here only by way of acknowledgment. Ikastolas, though, feature very 
prominently and so must be briefly explained. In the context of this project ikastolas are 
private schools which follow the D-model, but as private schools they emphasize Basque 
culture and Euskara language instruction more heavily than in the public setting. 
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Colloquially ikastola is often used interchangeably to describe both public and private D-
model schools. In this study I make a clear distinction mainly to provide clear delineation 
between the public and private.
1
 
4.3. CONCLUSION 
 The Basque region has a long history of negotiating domination and autonomy 
vis-à-vis the Spanish state. Throughout all of this Euskara has become the identifier for 
what it means to “be Basque”. This became especially important in light of suppression 
under and resistance to the Franco regime. Following the return to democracy in 1979, 
Euskara was given co-official status in País Vasco. Euskara Batua was standardized and 
instituted as a language of government and instruction. It thereafter entered the education 
arena as part of a unique three-model system in which school choice and enrollment is 
predicated on the dominant language of instruction. Given the structure of the education 
system and the importance language plays in it, this project examines the way in which 
schools serve as social spaces in which nation-building projects and language policies 
come together for young people as those projects are incorporated into policy. From there 
it ask looks at the way in which these projects become meaningful to young people and 
whether various forms of identity (Basque, Spanish, some sense of pan-European) have 
significance for them. 
The following chapter will begin with a discussion of why parents make the 
language and education model choices that they do. Afterward, it will move into a 
                                                          
1
 Much of the colloquial confusion comes out of the history of the ikastola system. Gardner (2002a, 2002b) 
states that the original ikastolas were formed even prior to the beginning of the Civil War but began to be 
clandestinely resurrected toward the end of the Franco regime. Following democratic reforms, they were 
given full legality but continued to operate more or less independently of central government core 
curriculum requirements. However, in 1992 the País Vasco Assembly passed educational reform laws 
requiring ikastolas to adopt reforms and either enter the public system or adhere to the curriculum 
guidelines for private schools. While many opted for the private system, some became public institutions 
but kept their ikastola names. 
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broader conversation about the impact of this language instruction on youth conceptions 
of identity, belonging, politics, and territory in Bilbao and País Vasco. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
This project examines issues surrounding the relationship between language 
education and the development of national identity in youth populations in the Basque 
region of País Vasco in Spain. It addresses how young people formulate their sense of 
identity in the context of regional autonomy and national devolution, supranationalism, 
and European integration. When exploring these issues, this paper gives attention to 
questions about how different layers of identity become meaningful to young people as 
well as how they formulate their own sense of identity. Specifically, it asks three broad 
questions in order to examine these issues. First, how are different political projects being 
incorporated into language policy in País Vasco? Second, how do different nation-
building projects become meaningful to young people in the region? Third, how do 
educational institutions (schools) function as social spaces in which nation-building 
projects and language policies come together for students? 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first looks at the issue of 
school models and the reasons for which students are placed in a particular track. While 
Gardner’s (2002a) says that there is no overarching reason to drive particular school 
choices, I posit that there are four main trends that can be observed. The second section 
examines the everyday language usage of youth people in Bilbao. This section examines 
youth spaces in the city and explores the varying social pressures young people feel 
surrounding language usage at different developmental stages and the negotiation of 
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language usage in the wider social city context. The third section broadens out to 
examine more macro scale issues of nationalist ideologies as internalized by these young 
people and the way in which they consequentially view País Vasco as a territory of 
belonging. 
5.1: LEARNING EUSKARA 
 Language and linguistic policies are closely tied in to nation-building projects. 
However, this is possibly becoming more complicated in the context of the European 
Union, devolution of state power in Spain, and increasingly globalization. Interviews 
with teachers, parents and students provide insight into the ways these complications are 
exhibited as they make choices about school models. The three model system of 
education in País Vasco is predicated on the ability of parents to choose which language 
– Castilian or Euskara – is the primary method of instruction and communication in the 
school. Under the law this choice is an absolute right. With the fact that Euskara is so 
important to Basque identity and in light of education regimes being pushed by 
nationalists and cultural preservationists, it becomes important to ask just why parents 
make the choice to enroll their children in particular schools. While this project is not 
focused on parents’ direct role in language and national identity inculcation in youths, it 
must nonetheless be acknowledged that they have a profound role in this process. If, as I 
contend and will expound on later, language education does have a role in introducing 
young people to nationalist ideals and in subtly inculcating these ideals, interviews with 
parents and teachers serve as a window into parents’ reasoning for introducing their 
students to particular institutions and language models. This must be examined as a way 
of understanding how nationalist ideals can potentially be passed down generationally. At 
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the same time, I consider that this nationalist identity may not be reproduced exactly 
since parents’ intentions may not matter to young people. We must also consider not just 
the reasons emphasized for learning Euskara, but the perceived ability of each school 
model to engage in that education. This section will then end with a brief discussion 
about the different viewpoints offered about D-model schools versus ikastola attendance 
when both systems on paper offer the same language track and curriculum model. 
Nationalist rhetoric says that school choice and placement in Euskara language 
model schools is important for preserving a sense of Basque identity unique from any 
other group in Spain. Bureaucratic discussions more dryly espouse the preservation of 
regional cultural and heritage in conjunction with learning Castilian as part of being a 
Spanish citizen. Even the names of the ministerial departments are wrapped up in this 
discussion. The language policies discussed here are overseen by the “Departamento de 
Educación, Política Lingüística y Cultura” which translates in English to the “Department 
of Education, Language policy, and Culture”. Education, language policy, and the 
vaguely defined “culture” are all considered closely related enough that they can fall 
under the purview of one minister. Outside the halls of government though, education 
choices have more subtleties than bureaucratic labels would suggest. Since all students 
must learn Euskara by law and different models teach it based on varying levels of 
immersion, the importance that parents place on learning Euskara can play a direct role in 
which model their child enters. I discuss a range of responses given to me by parents and 
students as to why Euskara instruction may be important to different individuals. Of 
course not all people hold it to be of equal importance and that is reflected in their 
perception of the different language models and child placement in them. Whereas 
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nationalist rhetoric and bureaucratic hierarchy promote Euskara education for certain 
reasons, we see on the ground, at the family level, that these reasons are only part of the 
picture. Parents select schools with particular language policies for a variety of reason, 
some ideological but others more pragmatic. While not necessarily representative of all 
viewpoints across País Vasco, the subtleties that come out in these interviews suggests 
that there are complicated reasons for choosing various schools. These complications in 
turn help highlight the varied ways in which young people negotiate national identity and 
how traditional understandings of nationalism are complicated when viewed at the 
personal level. 
 Because Euskara is the primary identifier of Basque identity and because País 
Vasco is widely seen as a hyper-politicized region overrun with nationalists and 
separatists, the perception outside the region is that choosing to place children in an 
Euskara dominant school is an explicit, politically motivated statement. According to my 
informants this was certainly the case upon the initial institution of the three-model 
system. However, the perception today – at least within País Vasco itself – is that this is 
no longer the case. Rather, this choice can also be based on depoliticized national 
culture/heritage reasons that will be discussed shortly. Of course, this is not to say that 
political motivation is still not one of the main causes. For those informants for whom 
politicized sentiment was the driving factor though, it was very quickly evident. Adere, in 
speaking about why she attended an ikastola, said very bluntly: 
Yes, I am a nationalist. That is who I am. I went to [the ikastola] because it had 
the best program. All of the classes are in Euskara, and Castilian only comes 
when you have to take those classes. We actually got into trouble if we spoke 
Castilian, and that is good because it taught people better the language. If you are 
Basque, you need to know your language. 
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This last sentence – “If you are Basque, you need to know your language” – is what 
separates the politicized nationalist reasons for entering an Euskara-dominant school 
from the depoliticized cultural/heritage reasons to be discussed in a moment. It has very 
explicit connotations tied to it about what it means to be Basque, and it is said with a 
hardline attitude. Argument is not acceptable. Granted, said in the context of someone 
also explicitly stating that she is a nationalist, the political connotations cannot be 
avoided. It is also important to note that Adere spoke so plainly and positively about 
punishment for speaking Castilian. For those entering the school for politically 
motivated, nationalist reasons, speaking Castilian is not just a rejection of national 
identity, but speaking it in the classroom corrupts the students’ ability to learn Euskara, 
the  thing needed to fully assume the mantle of being Basque. It is thus important to note 
that such reasons are present, even if they are not the main driving force in school choice 
for all – or even a majority – of families.  
 The second reason that a particular school model is chosen is a vaguer sense of 
culture or heritage. This is what language preservationists who are not ardent nationalist-
separatists proclaim. The idea of learning Euskara in order to preserve a sense of regional 
culture and heritage need not be political as hardline nationalists would have one believe. 
This illustrates the way in which national identity can encompass a range of emotions and 
perceptions, some stronger, some weaker. Rather than being a monolithic, political 
ideology, individuals may express national sentiment across a broad spectrum reflecting 
varying degrees of hardline or strong nationalism to softer emotional responses. In this 
way, informants spoke of the need to learn the language because it provides a sense of 
shared history. This presents what I call a depoliticized form of identity. Whereas 
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nationalists use Euskara to present overtly political messages and meanings, individuals 
who advocate for education in that language for cultural reasons consider themselves to 
have done so apolitically. One teacher, Juana, spoke of this when she told the story of one 
of her students in the ikastola where she works: 
I have a student whose father is [an elected official] in PP
2
. He puts his children in 
an ikastola because his wife is from the rural area in Bizkaia and they want all of 
the children to be able to speak with their grandparents in Euskara. The mother’s 
parents. He says that because it is their family history, their heritage, the children 
need to know where they come from…politically he is very opposed to the 
nationalists. He admits that he does not want to see País Vasco move away from 
Madrid. 
What Juana describes here is not just any random parent but a politically elected official 
who belongs to a party that stands against everything nationalist-separatists desire. 
Partido Popular is widely seen, for better or for worse, as the political descendants of the 
Francoist movement. The party is widely opposed, as Juana stated, to any attempt by 
nationalists to assert any form of independence or more autonomy from Madrid. Rather, 
this is the party that more than any other espouses the need for centralizing and 
assimilative practices in Spain. And yet, we see the father of one of her students who 
publicly stands for all of these things sending his children to an ikastola because he wants 
his children, who do not speak Euskara at home, to be able to learn the first tongue of 
their maternal grandparents so that they can feel connection with their wider family. 
 Other cultural reasons that came up in interviews were less sentimental but no less 
important. One of the ones that stood out most clearly in multiple interviews was the fact 
that learning Euskara allows individuals understand and more easily relate to the region’s 
history. Whereas things like connections with family members are emotional and tied to 
relationships, ideas like historical connections are more intangible. Multiple informants 
                                                          
2
 PP is the common abbreviation for Partido Popular, the leading center-right party in Spanish politics 
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spoke about the way in which in today’s world Euskara is a minority language with little 
use outside the region. However, by learning it they say, students are able to stay 
connected to their homeland and regional history by being able to explore that history in 
the language it was spoken and written. Unai, a university student specializing in History, 
took a particularly pragmatic view of this: 
“If I want to read about the history of northern Spain around cities like Bilbao, I 
need to read the papers and things that it was written on in original. The writers of 
documents in 1600 wrote in the language they used every day and in many places 
in the Basque Country that was in Euskara. If I cannot read those documents, how 
can I be a historian?” 
For Unai, knowing Euskara is necessary for his ability to be a historian and researcher. 
However, even informants who were not academics attempting to decipher centuries old 
tomes still spoke about how knowing the language helped concretize historical 
understanding. Words like “heritage” and phrases like “knowing where you come from” 
peppered these conversations. Euskara knowledge was not seen as a political statement 
but rather a way of grounding oneself (or one’s child) in the region from which he or she 
descends. Again, this reflects a negotiation of a broad spectrum of nationalist attitudes 
and positions that defy the idea of a single nationalist ideal or indoctrination. In this way, 
we see both government bureaucratic rhetoric tying language to a general sense of culture 
or history and hardline political ideologies like those promoted by groups such as ETA 
cropping up in conversations. No one single viewpoint dominates the internalized 
negotiations that are occurring but rather multiple viewpoints act as competing foci. 
 A third reason that came up for enrolling children in Euskara model schools was 
acclimatization to the region, the practical realization that speaking Euskara makes life 
easier and allows for wider social circles. It must be noted from the beginning that this 
was not a huge factor for many of my informants because they and their parents all grew 
 67 
up in fairly localized contexts around the city of Bilbao or in other parts of País Vasco 
close by it. However, given that emphasis was placed on it by multiple informants, it does 
need to be briefly discussed. Jon, a student who moved to País Vasco while in primary 
school, spoke about his parents’ decision to place him in a school that taught Euskara as 
more than just a single subject: 
“Yes, I was in a B-model school. My parents thought that it would be good for 
me, if I am going to grow up in Bilbao, to be able to speak with everyone. Most 
people speak Spanish but some people don’t. Sometimes there are signs on 
buildings or the streets that are in [Euskara] and if you can’t read them, how can 
you know what they say?” 
Jon, as well as Paula both spoke about the need to speak Euskara in order to be 
able to speak or read comfortably throughout the city. However, both stressed that this 
desire to acclimate did not come out of a feeling of exclusion. Rather, they felt that it was 
so that they could be more fully included. They made it clear that speaking only Spanish 
was not cause for exclusion throughout most of the city because, in the words of Paula, 
“everyone speaks [Castilian]”. They described speaking Euskara versus not speaking it as 
a situation that is layered, not as one that created a strict social dichotomy. This does of 
course raise issues about the situations in which each language is used and how to 
negotiate those practices socially, and that topic will be discussed in a later chapter. Here 
though it should be noted that learning Euskara can be seen not as necessity for fitting 
into Basque society but rather adding depth to the experience. Again, Paula states: 
“If someone in a group does not know Euskara that is OK. We can speak 
Castilian. But if everyone can speak Euskara and is comfortable with it, we can do 
that since some people are most comfortable in that language.” 
Her statement raises questions about whether or not it is proper to defer to individuals 
who are fluent in one language or the other in a group that is fluent in both tongues, but I 
see the power dynamics at play here being more a facet of the individuals who are not in 
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the group of friends rather than a widespread practice of marginalizing Castilian speech. 
Paula, who was born to parents who do not speak Euskara, sees her fluency learned in 
school as a way for her to interact more robustly with those around her. 
 The last of the four reasons for which parents might pursue an Euskara dominated 
education model for their children is that it offers economic mobility in País Vasco. 
Repeatedly informants – including those who also voiced any of the other three reasons 
previously mentioned – repeatedly stated that if a parent wants their child to get a good 
job, he or she needs to know Euskara. Even if parents are not fully committed to the 
nationalist project, they still recognize that one of its key aspects – Euskara fluency – is 
highly desirable in the region. This reiterates yet again the complex ways in which people 
negotiate identities and nationalist policies. Maialena and Ainhoa, teachers at a D-model 
school near the heart of Bilbao, spoke together about the importance of not only having 
knowledge but fluency in Euskara: 
Maialena: Why study Euskara? Because if you do not know it, you don’t get a 
good job. It’s that simple. If you want simple work like being a cleaning lady, 
speaking Castilian only is fine. But if you want a good paying job for which you 
can get promoted – like in a bank or as a lawyer or getting a good government job 
– for those kinds of things you need to know both languages. 
Ainhoa: Yes. When a student graduates he needs to have that, how do you say it, 
the certificate, the license from the government…that says you have the grade and 
are fluent. 
Maialena: It’s very true. If an employer asks you to prove your fluency and you 
don’t have the certificate, you won’t get the job. Especially in the economy today, 
you have to be fluent. 
This issue of the current economic situation in Spain came up repeatedly in 
conversations as talk turned to the need of bilingual fluency for even entry-level 
positions. At the time of my fieldwork, Spain’s overall unemployment rate hovered at 
just over twenty-five percent and the rate for under-30s was even more dismal, ranging 
from forty-five to fifty percent. While informants spoke about how País Vasco was 
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slightly better off than the rest of Spain due to the regional government’s fiscal autonomy 
from Madrid, they all nonetheless spoke about how bleak the job market was. Because of 
this bleakness, bilingual fluency in both Castilian and Euskara is often seen as the most 
basic of marketable skills one can offer an employer. Said Nahia: 
Even if you want a job working in a shop selling shirts and clothes, you need to be 
able to tell the boss that you can speak [both languages]. That way he knows that 
if a customer comes in you can make them feel comfortable by speaking to them 
how they want. 
It seems very clear that the largest factor for many parents in placing their 
children in Euskara schools seems to be pragmatic in nature. They want their children to 
succeed and to have viable careers as they become independent and leave home. 
Knowledge of Euskara is seen as an important factor in ensuring this. Euskara is not 
officially required for most jobs; however, knowledge of the language is seen as giving 
an advantage, even if only a slight one, to job seekers. Not every parent saw it as the 
ultimate means to an end though. While I heard fairly consistently that it is beneficial, 
some also admitted that it is really only the case if individuals stay in the relatively small 
geographic areas in which Euskara is widely spoken. This was summed up best in a 
statement made by Begoña, a mother of three who has one child living and living outside 
País Vasco, one relatively close to Bilbao, and a third not yet out of high school. She said 
“It’s a good thing to know if you are going to work here in País Vasco, maybe in 
Navarra, but other than [those places], it’s not as useful. My son [the oldest child] 
lives in Madrid and works for a travel company organizing tours for people from 
other countries. He doesn’t use Euskara and has forgotten a lot of it. My daughter 
[the middle child] lives in a small town south of Bilbao though and speaks it all 
the time with her boyfriend and in the streets. When [my youngest daughter] 
graduates and then finishes training to be a nurse like she wants to be, she will 
need it if she is going to work in País Vasco. It’s good to know if you want to 
work here. If you are like [my son] though and want to work in Madrid or a 
foreign country, it’s not so important for work. But it’s good for the option.” 
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  While arguing that learning Euskara is not necessary to achieve a good position, 
Begoña nonetheless backs up the statements made by other individuals in that learning 
Euskara allows for flexibility in the work force. Learning the language opens doors that 
monolingualism does not necessarily provide. Fairly uniformly all of my informants 
praised government efforts to also teach foreign languages in schools in order to make for 
a more competitive work force. However, even while acknowledging the importance of 
foreign language knowledge, bilingual fluency in Castilian and Euskara is seen as the 
minimum effective attributes a young person can bring to a job. For this reason, the 
largest driving factor in wanting to learn Euskara in schools is to prepare students for the 
work force. Nationalist agendas, cultural heritage, and even regional acclimatization may 
all play a role as well, but economic viability sits at the forefront of many people’s minds. 
The current state of affairs in Spain and the wider European Union market only 
exacerbate this. Schools are seen as important learning institutions, but they are not 
necessarily perceived as places in which young people come to internalize national 
projects. Rather, the spaces and ways in which national projects are negotiated and 
internalized by young people are layered and complicated, negating the idea of a single, 
solid nationalist agenda on the ground. 
As previously discussed, there are several reasons that parents consider when 
choosing which language model school in which to place their children. These models are 
organized around the amount of instruction that occurs in each language – Castilian and 
Euskara. Since the stated goal of government policy is the bilingual fluency in each 
language of all students who pass through the Basque education system, the question 
arises as to whether each model actually achieves that goal. For interest in this project, 
 71 
the question is even more nuanced – how do parents, teachers, and young people perceive 
the effectiveness of each model? The answer to that question is fairly straightforward – 
those affiliated with D-model and ikastolas consider the other two models to impart 
inferior language lessons, though they give some leniency to B-model schools. There is 
also a perception of difference between public D-model schools and ikastolas, but it will 
be briefly discussed in the following section. The prevailing attitude among individuals 
associated with the Euskara dominant models is succinctly seen in the following 
statement from Udane, a student who has native fluency in Euskara and Castilian both 
but has spent extensive time studying in the United States and is certified with a native 
fluency in English as well: 
“The people who are not in the D-model, the ikastola systems - they don’t learn 
Euskara if they don’t speak it at home. It’s that simple. B-model schools are not 
as bad, but because the students don’t speak Euskara all the time, because they 
don’t use it at home, because it’s OK in the classroom to switch to [Castilian], it 
doesn’t stick. Students in the A-model though, they get nothing. They learn 
Euskara the same way Americans learn Spanish – they study for a test and then 
when it’s done, they forget it all. Those students are good for saying hello and 
counting to ten. Maybe saying a few colors.” 
Those students in B-model schools see A-model schools as rather incapable of 
imparting Euskara while acknowledging their own middle ground status as the preferred 
method for children from a Castilian-speaking home as well. The B-model is perceived 
by these people to be a solution for those students who enter the system from households 
not speaking Euskara because it allows the students to acclimate to the new language of 
Euskara without being overwhelmed by a full immersion. Jon, as previously mentioned, 
moved to País Vasco with his family while he was in primary school. Part of the reason 
they chose a B-model school was for the acclimatization reasons discussed earlier, but 
they felt full immersion would overwhelm their son: 
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“I went to a school that mixed the languages because I never spoke [Euskara] 
before. In Andalucía everyone speaks [Castilian] and so I didn’t know anything 
else. When I went to a school where [Euskara] was used to teach more than a 
language class meant that I picked it up more sooner than in [an A-model school] 
but I could still speak the language I grew up speaking.” 
Those parents and students who choose A-model schools were all almost 
completely monolingual in Castilian and felt that Euskara language classes provided 
enough context and instruction. The perception of these schools among the other model 
groups also tends to be that A-model schools are for those individuals who either are not 
native to the Basque regions (i.e. emigrants from other parts of Spain or foreign 
immigrants), care little for Basque heritage, or who are politically opposed to Basque 
nationalism and identity politics. As has been discussed, this may not actually be the case 
all the time though because there are people who fall into these categories that 
nonetheless use B- or D-model schools or ikastolas. The perception nonetheless remains. 
Regardless, those in these A-model schools feel that the amount of language instruction is 
adequate for what is needed. Statements on the matter tend to be fairly short but focus 
around the fact that because Castilian is co-official with Euskara, it is what is used by the 
vast majority of Spain, and “everyone already speaks it anyway” (as stated by Eneko). 
While the views on nationalist politics and identity discussions among this group did tend 
to be ambivalent at the most accommodating end of the spectrum, none of the individuals 
I spoke with were vehemently opposed to nationalists. More importantly in my mind, no 
one, even members of the A-model affiliation group, were opposed to Euskara education 
or usage. These individuals simply either did not see the need for full immersion or said 
that it would be too confusing for a child from a non-native Euskara-speaking home to be 
thrown into a system in which subjects other than those directly instructing Euskara 
literacy and fluency were taught. 
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All of this together shows that not only are the reasons for which people choose 
certain models complicated, but so too are the perceptions of the models themselves. 
Each group of individuals has a slightly nuanced version of the school system with which 
the others are affiliated. These different perceptions also play into the school system 
choice made by parents. Which language model choice a parent makes is an extremely 
nuanced decision with varying perceptions of the level of fluency to be gained. 
Nationalist policies and by extension the nationalist movements behind them then are 
approached with the idea of choice in mind. This choice can have the emotional 
connection of nationalist rhetoric behind it for some but for others it can be one of 
pragmatism, indicating an idea of identity as flexible and one choice among many others 
to be made as part of other decisions. 
 For the last part of this section, I want to briefly discuss the perceived differences 
between enrolling students in the public D-model schools and a private ikastola system 
that follows the same basic curriculum but generally has small fees associated with them. 
Very quickly it becomes evident in conversation that while both D-model and ikastola 
systems are generally chosen because of their ability to teach Euskara lessons, the 
ikastola schools are seen as being slightly better at it. The reason for this perception 
comes from the fact that ikastolas are seen as being more stringent in their teaching 
methods and less willing to let students use Castilian outside of Castilian language and 
literature classrooms. Izaro, a teacher at an ikastola, went so far as to say that students 
were not even supposed to speak in Castilian on the playground because “that means they 
aren’t practicing all the time like they are supposed to do at school”. 
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In addition, ikastolas have history on their side in encouraging the idea that they 
are better at imparting Euskara knowledge. As discussed in Chapter III, the modern 
history of the ikastola system began with clandestine structures set up in the later part of 
the Franco years. Even in areas where these schools were not suppressed, they were not 
encouraged and sometimes operated more as extracurricular activities than as full-fledged 
schools. This history lends the idea of the ikastola an aura of fervency and authenticity. 
With the imposition of co-official status and a bilingual system, the perception among 
many in the population was that there were not enough teachers fluent in Euskara to 
effectively teach it. Ikastolas by their very definition were private institutions that 
emphasized and even reveled in their Euskara usage and knowledge. This perception still 
surfaces some today in conversation. However, it also comes alongside some political 
tensions associated with that history. Because ikastolas were originally clandestine, they 
were seen as the bastions of ardent nationalists clamoring for separatism. According to 
informants though, while this perception may still persist outside País Vasco in other 
parts of Spain, it is not a widely held view within the region itself. In the words of Juana, 
a teacher: 
 “When I was a student in the 80s, [ikastola] attendance was very much political. 
My parents were nationalists and I was one too. …Today, that is not so. Today 
ikastolas are more about being the best way to learn Euskara. You know if your 
child goes to an ikastola that she is going to get teachers who really know the 
language and will always teach in it like they are supposed to do.” 
 Since placement in a particular school model is a legal right of parents in País 
Vasco and these decisions are centered around the dominant language of instruction, 
perceptions about identity, language, and the need to emphasize education in one 
language or the other are significant factors in making that choice. The reasons parents 
choose one model or another vary from family to family and hinge on a variety of factors 
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such as the importance parents place on Euskara instruction and why they feel it is 
important or not. Furthermore, perceptions of the effectiveness of each model type at 
Euskara instruction can affect the choice. Parents who stress the need for the best fluency 
possible, for whatever reason, look towards D-model and ikastola schools. Those who see 
it as not as important or who themselves do not speak the language and feel their children 
would be overwhelmed in an Euskara-dominant school look to A- and B-models to 
varying degrees. The efficacy of each model as well as the perceptions of the schools is 
important to consider as we move into the next two sections of this chapter. Everyday 
language use and the role of the school in that are directly tied into how students are 
instructed and help form their opinions are language spaces and negotiations in the city of 
Bilbao. These will be important topics discussed in the next section before finally moving 
into the last portion of this chapter where political ideologies, regional identities, and 
implications of Euskara language education are discussed. 
5.2: EVERYDAY LANGUAGE USAGE 
 While the previous section discussed the ways in which school model choice are 
made by parents, this section moves into an examination of the ways in which young 
people actually use language on a daily basis in Bilbao. As has been covered, one of the 
primary goals of the education system in País Vasco is to create a bilingual population. 
While the state rhetoric is that each model type provides adequate instruction for this to 
occur, perceptions in the population differ as to the truth of this ideal. Different school 
models and methods of instruction are perceived to convey different levels of fluency in 
Euskara. Just as there are many nuanced reasons for which people value Euskara 
education and for why they choose to enroll their children in a particular model, so too is 
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actual daily usage of the language varied on the ground. Even in youth populations that 
have fluency in Euskara, the actual usage of it varies from place to place and time to 
time. While language preservationists argue that language instruction and fluency is the 
key to saving Euskara from the danger of extinction, knowledge does not guarantee 
usage. It is actual language usage that preserves a language and its richness. Therefore, it 
becomes important to examine the ways in which young people actually do speak and use 
Euskara and how it serves or doesn’t serve particular nation-building projects. In order to 
explore this topic, this section considers three main issues. First, what social spaces do 
young people inhabit in the city? The school setting may serve as the center of language 
instruction, but is it seen as a primary space for young people? How do they function 
socially outside of school? How does their daily language usage reflect what they learn in 
school? Second, I will briefly discuss the dynamics of language usage at different stages 
in young people’s development. Important questions include whether young people’s 
language usage and emphasis shifts as they mature and how this is impacted by their 
growing sense of personal and group identity as they move towards the age of majority. 
The third and last part of this section explores how young people negotiate language 
usage throughout the city of Bilbao. Outside of youth spaces, how do young people 
decide what language to use at any given time? What are the cues that determine which 
language is proper in a given situation? Are these language negotiations necessarily 
exclusionary or are they a layered phenomenon? 
 If you are going to talk about both language education and daily language usage 
in young people, the role of the school as a space in which young people interact must be 
considered. While most of the population that inhabits school spaces on a daily basis is 
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composed of young people, do they consider it one of “their” spaces? This is an 
important question to ask and attempt to answer. If young people feel that the school 
functions as one of their primary interactive spaces, the requirements placed on them – be 
they about language usage or otherwise – do not necessarily feel imposed. If, however, 
and as I argue, the school is seen not as a youth space but as one belonging to the state, 
reaction against school strictures can also be seen as subtle subversion of the state.  
 The idea that schools function as youth spaces comes from the fact that they are in 
fact occupied throughout the day mostly by young people. However, rather than being 
perceived by those youths as a space in which they interact and operate socially, schools 
are seen as state impositions. While admitting that social interaction does occur in these 
places, youth informants generally see this as limited and not as meaningful as what goes 
on outside the school. This feeling is not unique to students of any one school model or 
structure in Bilbao. Whereas perceptions of each other’s schools themselves may have 
varied from informant to informant, they are all acknowledged as places belonging to 
someone other than the youth population. The school as an institution is seen as a space 
imposed on young people by adults – the state – in an effort to regulate behavior and 
learning. While this regulation is not seen as a regulation that unduly restricts young 
people, it is regulation nonetheless. Similar statements on the subject came from young 
people throughout the study regardless of school model or current university setting. 
School is seen as a learning environment, not a social one for interaction with friends and 
acquaintances. In the words of Irati: 
“Schools are just a place where you go in high school because you have to.” 
And again from Mikel: 
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“Youth space? No. Schools are not that. We only go to school for class and for 
learning. We hang out with friends [in other places].” 
And last from Nora: 
“You don’t go to school to make friends or meet people. You go to learn. I may 
meet some of my friends there but I know them because I hang out with them in 
other places.”  
 These sentiments then beg the question – if the school is not seen as a social space 
for young people in which they can interact freely with peers, what then are youth spaces 
in Bilbao? And within these spaces, outside the strictures placed on language usage in the 
schools, how do young people use Euskara and/or Castilian when in groups with their 
friends? The answer to both of these questions is both simple and yet no so at the same 
time. When examining the idea of youth spaces in Bilbao, asking what areas young 
people feel are their own, both students and adults interviewed revealed that the city does 
not really have spaces that can be considered as just belonging to youths. Rather, youth 
spaces are fleeting and forme in general areas only when young people are present. These 
spaces are not spaces which are universally acknowledged as belonging solely to young 
people. Instead they are said to belong only at certain times. At other times these spaces 
are seen as belonging to other groups specifically or the general public more broadly. 
This is because the spaces seen as belonging to youths in Bilbao are formed in places 
shared by multiple age groups. When asked about the concept of youth spaces, even 
adults were momentarily confused by the idea that there might be concretized locations 
rather than simple group congregations. Juana, when asked if her students saw school as a 
youth space, explained that they did not and went on to describe what does constitute 
such an area in Bilbao: 
“If you are going to say that there is a [space] for young people, it is going to be 
out on the streets. Especially on weekends. Teenagers go out and stand on the 
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sidewalk and in the street and in parks – places like that – and they talk and play 
and drink. Those are the places for young people. Adults do not go there.” 
 These sentiments are echoed by young people. They say that there is no real space 
in Bilbao for them to go all the time. Rather, one simply hangs out with friends in 
whatever public space is available and it only becomes a youth space when vacated by 
other groups or when enough young people have arrived to crowd out others. 
Interestingly, the one informant who did speak about moves to create spaces for young 
people to go, to socialize, and to congregate other than public areas was Adere. In her 
words, the groups attempting to create these spaces, rather than being government or 
civic organizations, are political parties seeking to mobilize young people into youth 
wings of their organizations. However, when pressed on these institutions, she, as well as 
later informants questioned about them, admitted that they are limited in scope and not 
well attended except by individuals who are already politically active. Otherwise young 
people continue to simply occupy public areas and inhabit youth spaces that are 
ephemeral at best as they form and dissipate only when the young people themselves do 
so. 
 Regardless of where young people congregate and what they see as their own 
space, we must still consider how they use language in these areas. Just as with defining 
what are youth spaces is both simple and layered, so too is language usage. The spaces 
are simple because they are readily acknowledged to exist but complicated because 
discerning what makes them is contingent on subjective ideas of youth social practices. 
Similarly, language usage in these spaces is fairly straightforward because everyone 
readily admits that both Castilian and Euskara are used. However, the nuances of doing 
so are much more finely focused. Some informants, especially those not as fluent in 
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Euskara or who use it primarily in the school setting, talk of using only Castilian in 
public. Those fluent in Euskara, who use it at home, and who consider it their mother 
tongue speak about the way in which they switch between languages based on who is 
present in a group or at what locale they are. This is further complicated by the fact that 
Euskara is such a complex language family with a standardized form that is taught in 
schools. As mentioned in Chapter III, there are several dialects, sub-dialects, and regional 
variations within Euskara. On top of this is layered Batua. Udane explained the added 
complexities this causes by saying: 
 “I feel more comfortable speaking Euskara than I do Castilian, and a lot of my 
friends are the same way. But, not everyone speaks it the same. [My friend] only 
learned to speak Euskara in school and so she only knows the Standard form. I 
grew up speaking Biscayan, but I also know Standard and understand some other 
dialects. [My other friend] is from [a small town] where they speak another 
dialect that doesn’t sound like Standard, so when we all talk together, we have to 
use Standard or Castilian so that [my first friend] doesn’t have a hard time 
understanding.” 
 This specific example in a group that are all in theory fluent in the same language 
and comfortable speaking it shows just how layered and complex Euskara usage can be 
for young people. Young people face an extremely complex language landscape because 
not only do they have to negotiate whether to use Castilian or Euskara, but they also have 
to deal with the fact that Euskara itself with a layered language experience with 
sometimes complex differences between dialects. Batua may address some of these issues 
by introducing a standardized form that everyone is nominally fluent in having learned it 
in school, but even then its unintelligibility with some of the sub-dialects and regional 
variations may cause confusion for individuals who grew up speaking one of the latter in 
the home. Rather than serving as a national identifier then, Euskara usage and negotiation 
again reflects choices to be made. 
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 Outside the social spaces created by congregating youths and reflecting the 
complexities that come with deciding when to use Euskara or Castilian with peers, young 
people must also daily decide when to use language in the wider landscape of the city. 
País Vasco is officially bilingual. According to the law, either language may be used in 
any setting in the region. On paper this means that everything from interactions with 
government officials to window shopping may be conducted in the language of choice for 
the individual citizen. Speaking to individuals on the ground though, the actual daily 
decisions about language usage are not so simple. In many settings around the city, one 
language or the other is given preference over the other. This can be gleaned both from 
interviews with informants and through observation methods as you walk through the 
city. Such navigation is part of the everyday experience for residents in the city. What 
drives the choice is sometimes overt clues, sometimes mere pragmatism. The young 
people interviewed referred to the latter when they discussed the use of Castilian in the 
main areas of the city. Citing the fact that these are the most highly trafficked areas with 
the possibility of interacting with people who are not from País Vasco, including hordes 
of tourists, Castilian is used to converse in places like stores and cafes. However, when in 
smaller, areal context such as peripheral neighborhoods or localized establishments, 
implicit clues, aside from auditory indications, are used. Calling to mind Billig’s 
description of banal flagging, informants talked about how the subconsciously slipped 
from one language to another. Leire said: 
“When I go into a bar I just know what language to use. Sometimes it is Euskara, 
sometimes it is Castilian. …No, [it isn’t prompted].” 
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However, just because there is this negotiation does not mean that there are repercussions 
for speaking the “other” language than is used in a certain setting. To hold the idea that 
language usage in this context is exclusionary would be misguided. While informants did 
talk about the way in which picking and insisting on one language can be a way to make 
a statement, they also talked about the way in which an individual can slip between 
tongues without worry in public settings. In fact, in unfamiliar settings or in those highly 
trafficked areas just mentioned, using Castilian as a safety measure is normal. To be very 
clear, “safety” in this context does not mean that individuals fear for their actual physical 
well-being but rather they wish to avoid any misunderstanding. While many informants 
said the same individually, interview sessions with multiple people were particularly 
enlightening in this regard as people discussed among themselves the way in which they 
approach this issue. Udane, June, and Irati and Oier and Unai talked extensively about the 
way one approaches things like café counters or cash registers, speaking Castilian out of 
politeness in case someone does not know Euskara. However, there was consensus that, if 
the individual used Euskara, the conversation could switch to that language with no 
problem, or vice versa as needed. In this way, young people spoke of daily negotiations 
in the public sphere not as a political statement but as a matter of practicality and social 
niceties. Hardline political ideologues on either side of the issue may maintain usage of 
either Castilian or of Euskara as making a statement about identity or beliefs, but to many 
young people, everyday usage in the city is much simpler. It does not have to have deeper 
meaning other than speaking comfortably with friends or ensuring a coffee order is 
placed correctly. Language usage does not even have to be “pure” with every informant 
acknowledging uniformly that pidgin forms are used constantly as vocabulary from one 
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language or the other constantly bleeds over into conversations held in the other tongue. 
Even though Euskara is considered a defining characteristic of the region and the Basque 
people group, individuals acknowledge that usage can be varied on a personal level. 
Markel, who admits to speaking only the most basic amounts of Euskara, had this to say: 
“It’s not bad if you don’t speak Euskara. I don’t feel uncomfortable if I’m in a 
neighborhood [in Bilbao] or in [a little town] in the countryside where everyone 
speaks Euskara. It’s OK because everyone knows that not everyone speaks it.” 
 One other issue to briefly examine is the way in which language usage shifts in 
young people as they mature. This conversation primarily concerns the usage among 
children who are enrolled in Euskara-dominant schools. What language do they use as 
they move through the school system given a choice? Does it shift through time? If so, 
what is the reason for this shift? Even though, as previously discussed, these young 
people do not on a daily basis see language usage in public settings as a political 
statement and more as a matter of convenience or practicality, it must also be 
remembered that the young people interviewed have reached the age of majority. These 
are individuals who are already finished with their primary and secondary education and 
so are beyond the requirements that they have to use both Euskara and Castilian both in 
formal settings each day. For the children still under these strictures though, maturation is 
coupled with the desire to act against these imposed guidelines in the proverbial teenaged 
rebellion. Whereas those who are of age and have graduated have the right to make their 
own language choices, students in school do not have this freedom. Their behavior is 
regulated by the state in the form of language usage. However, while they may act 
against these rules, they do not necessarily see it as an act of state subversion but rather as 
a form of social negotiation and maturation. Juana, in describing her students, talks about 
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the way in which her ikastola prohibits the use of Castilian outside of specific classes as a 
way of encouraging full immersion. 
“When [the students] are in the primary classes, they only talk in Euskara like 
they are supposed to do. When they get a little older though, in the [middle 
school] grades they start to have conversations in Castilian when they are talking 
to themselves or on the playground. They aren’t supposed to do it but they think it 
makes them look cool. That’s because, you know, all the movie stars and football 
players and people like that speak Castilian and that’s just part of being cool.” 
 This attitude illustrates the complex issues surrounding both language instruction 
and the way in which Euskara education efforts battle the hegemonic forces of Castilian 
language society and media. In order to preserve the language, Basque governments 
instituted Euskara education models. However, because the region is still situated within 
the wider Spanish media system in which nationally produced programs are made in 
Castilian, these efforts are complicated by constant bombardment of Castilian 
programing. This again goes back to Billig’s arguments about the ways in which every 
day experiences subtly reinforce or complicate nationalizing projects, even language 
education. However, it also illuminates the complicated negotiations in which young 
people make daily. While older youths speak of language usage in terms of being 
comfortable or issues of practicality in daily interactions, they also talk about the way in 
which minors see language as an issue of social standing. Media figures do not use 
Euskara; old people and politicians do. However, as they reach the age of maturity, 
juvenile notions of language as “cool” begin to shift as people enter the wider society as 
citizens. Instead of seeing the language as a way to affiliate themselves with glitz, it 
assumes more mundane meanings that arise as they order their morning coffee. 
 Negotiating language choices on a daily basis is a multi-layered event for young 
people in Bilbao. Within the spaces that youth populations consider their own, there are 
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complicated internal decisions to be made in social settings as they choose between 
speaking Euskara, Castilian, or some hybridized form of the two. This is complicated 
even further by the fact that Euskara Batua – Standard Basque – is the official form of the 
language but not necessarily what is spoken in the home or in every pocketed region of 
País Vasco. The spaces that young people inhabit only further blur this picture as so-
called “youth spaces” in Bilbao are ephemeral at best, mirroring as it were the constantly 
shifting language usage in them. Instead, young people are seen to interact mostly within 
public spaces, only gaining their own areas when there are large crowds of them present 
and the premises are vacated by other groups. Outside of these instances though, young 
people in the city still have complicated decisions about language usage to make as they 
perform everyday activities. However, rather than making this decision based on overt 
statements about identity, young people talk about choosing languages in public settings 
based on comfort and practicality, acknowledging that even if the person in question 
takes a hardline view of Basque identity and language preservation one way or the other, 
the region is still nonetheless multilingual. Finally, in addition to making these social 
negotiations, young people have strong internal decisions to make as they mature. Living 
as they do in a minority-language region, they are bombarded on a daily basis by media 
in the dominant language group. The process of deciding which language to use in social 
situations becomes complicated as they attempt to decipher which language brings more 
social prestige. This becomes more complex as they come closer to the age of majority 
and economic issues begin to surface as language fluency and usage becomes a matter of 
employment pragmatism. In summation, the daily choices made by young people about 
young people in their spaces and in public spaces are complicated and must sometimes be 
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tenderly negotiated, but the reasoning behind their decisions often boil down to mundane, 
banal experiences rather than political or national ideology. 
5.3: NATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES AND TERRITORIALITY 
The last section of this chapter will explore two issues related to the manifestation 
of nationalist ideologies in young people. The first thing that must be discussed is the 
affiliation that young people profess politically. Euskara is so often that marker used to 
define being Basque and it is defended and promoted with religious fervor by hardline 
nationalists. Because of this, they promote Euskara education programs and large 
portions of the population, especially young people, now speak the language. However, 
the question arises as to whether these same young people who are being educated 
because of this preservationist and nationalist agenda also affiliate with nationalist 
parties. If there is a lack of sympathy for nationalist sympathy, the question begins to 
arise as to why these policies are pursued. Following that conversation, we must turn to 
the idea of País Vasco’s territoriality. As discussed in Chapter I, nationalism is directly 
tied to the concept of territorial integrity. A group of people cannot make a national claim 
unless they also have a territorial homeland, real or imagined, to claim as their own. 
Basque nationalists not only have a well-defined homeland but also wield large amounts 
of effective power in it, receiving large concessions of autonomy from the central 
government for the Spanish portions of it. This makes it important to examine how young 
people, as the future generations inheriting this territory, conceive of País Vasco and of 
its relationship with Spain, as well as the supranational influence of the European Union. 
País Vasco is seen by many people in the region as an area separated from the rest 
of Spain not just by its separatist political beliefs but also by a perceived predominant 
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left-of-center stance that differentiates it from other regions in the country. The young 
people I spoke to talked about how, especially amid the current financial crisis, País 
Vasco stood slightly above the rest of the country on the basis its fiscal autonomy and 
protected social safety net. While much of the rest of Spain is forced to undergo stringent 
fiscal austerity measures in order to receive the funds it needs to remain solvent, País 
Vasco is able to mitigate some of the more painful such measures within its own borders. 
For young people who express nationalist viewpoints, this is only a further example of 
the corrosive influence of Madrid that retaining autonomy has helped avoid. Udane, 
speaking bluntly, said: 
“These other regions, they are having huge problems right now because the 
Spanish government is able to tell them what to do all the time and they don’t 
have control over their own money. Here, that is not the case. Our government is 
able to control its own spending and so we are able to protect things that matter to 
us like the health care system.” 
 These views mirrored those of other young people who stated that País Vasco is 
better off than other places in Spain or even in Europe because of the way the nationalists 
were able to garner enough power from the central government that they have fiscal 
autonomy. This bodes well for the largest nationalist party in País Vasco, the moderate 
center-left Partido Nacionalista Vasco. PNV has in recent years rejected calls for outright 
secession, touting as they do the security that comes with staying in the larger state entity 
that is Spain. However, though, they do not advocate and in fact actively resist any calls 
for surrendering some of their autonomy back to Madrid. Young people, even proclaimed 
nationalists such as Udane, admit that while they like the idea of an independent País 
Vasco, they can also see given the current economic landscape how devastating 
independence would be. Similarly though, those students who are verbally reject 
nationalist sentiments still give credit to those political parties for the stability that comes 
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to the region from their influence. Markel, describing himself as “probably more 
conservative than anything else” said: 
“I’m not political. I don’t think we should leave Spain. But [the nationalists] have 
made [this] one of the best places to live in Spain. Our banks haven’t had to be 
bailed out and there are fewer unemployed people here so I’m OK with them if 
they are in power.” 
The last issue raised here by Markel of the nationalists being in power is also an 
important point to consider. The last Basque government was a coalition of the 
conservative Partido Popular and the socialist Partido Socialista Obrero Español designed 
specifically to unseat the PNV after almost 30 uninterrupted control as the majority or 
dominant coalition partner in government. While PNV received the largest portion of the 
votes in that election, they won only a plurality in the regional assembly. Because of this, 
a coalition of erstwhile opponents formed and kept them from power, only to then be 
saddled with the blame for the downturn that did occur in País Vasco. While it was still 
not as bad as the rest of Spain, the blame for hardship was transferred to the coalition 
parties that were widely seen as having betrayed their principles for the sake of petty 
politics and their own political ill-will towards nationalists. The anger at these coalition 
partners manifested itself not just in concerns about the economy, though. Many of the 
young people I spoke with saw PP, descendant of the ruling conservative party under 
Franco, in particular has having been especially politically devious because of the 
longstanding antipathy they had towards PSOE. Reflecting the way in which politics in 
País Vasco is indeed more complex than just arguments about regional autonomy and 
language issues, some informants mentioned in particular how País Vasco is a more 
socially liberal region than others in Spain and that they were afraid PP would attempt – 
at the national and the regional level – to cut services like healthcare and public transit, 
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limit reproductive rights, and roll back social initiatives such as gay marriage that had 
been introduced in the previous decade. All of this though still took place within wider 
conversations about the role of the economy and the European experience. 
When asked how individuals felt about the European Union and whether there 
was any affiliation to it, informants of all groups laughed. To these individuals Europe is 
simply an economic project. Attempts to spur considerations of social or civic programs 
were met with confusion while questions about Europe’s directives on regional language 
protections were met with blank stares at best and denial that such things exist at worst. 
Indeed, the idea that there might be some sense of European identity in youth populations 
was laughable. While expressing appreciation for things like open borders or educational 
opportunities that came with wider integration, these were still discussed in economic 
terms. And, given the time period in which this field work was conducted, much of that 
conversation centered on the perception that foreign countries, Germany in particular, 
were imposing their will on countries like Spain. Oier went so far as to reiterate the joke 
that Germany had finally found through the European Union the way to conquer Europe 
without engaging in open warfare. 
In the end, the political beliefs to which young people in País Vasco ascribe are 
complex. Even individuals who do not agree with nationalist viewpoints accept that they 
have done good things for the region. Other political parties, in particular the 
conservative PP, are blamed for current economic hardships felt throughout the region 
and the wider country. The idea that young people could have a wider sense of European 
identity or affiliation outside of economic interests was ludicrous to many and puzzling to 
others. However, these conversations must still be taken in context of the wider economic 
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crisis that was paralyzing the continent at this time. Regardless, the fact that individuals 
hold these views is only beneficial to nationalist parties at this time, even if not to be 
cause of nationalism. They are seen as the antithesis of the system that caused financial 
meltdown and the guarantors of the current structural regime that mitigated the crisis on 
País Vasco by ensuring fiscal autonomy. This in turn helps foster a sense of moderated 
nationalism even among individuals who are not themselves ardent Basque nationalists. 
Rather than seeing parties such as PNV as wild-eyed separatists, they are seen as a party 
which acts to safeguard the region from wider potential ruin by financial manipulation. 
While this trend of moderate nationalism must be viewed through the lens of the current 
situation in Europe, it nonetheless in the short term speaks volumes for the cause of 
nationalism. Rather than advancing nation-building projects, nationalism seem to have 
fallen by the wayside in this context. 
 In addition to how young people identify politically, I want to end by discussing 
the idea of País Vasco as a space and how this can be influenced, however subtly, by 
language. To begin, the idea of a Basque homeland is tied into the language itself. Mark 
Kurlansky writes that the Euskara term for the greater Basque Country made up of all 
seven historic provinces is “Euskal Herria”. Rather than translating literally as “Basque 
Country”, it roughly translates as “Land of the Euskara speakers”. Similarly, the Euskara 
term for someone of Basque descent, “Euskaldun” translates roughly to “Euskara 
speaker”. These words, internalized every time they are spoken, help inculcate the idea 
that someone is Basque by speaking Euskara and that those people and that language are 
tied directly to the ground on which they stand. Embedded in the language itself is the 
necessary territorial claim needed for nationalism. This is not always so overtly stated, 
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but sometimes references to the territorial distinctions do come up in conversation with 
young people. 
 One of the simplest questions I asked my informants during their interviews was 
where they tell people they are from if they are (or imagined they would be) traveling 
outside of País Vasco, particularly in a foreign country. The responses were surprising. 
While one would expect the vocally nationalist students to proclaim their loyalty to País 
Vasco, it came out that most everyone began by saying that they would say they are from 
“the city of Bilbao in País Vasco”. While a few informants hedged the bluntness of this 
statement by immediately qualifying it as being in Spain, one informant, Udane, was 
incredibly blunt and also interesting given her widespread travels in both Europe and the 
United States, the latter of which included two separate yearlong living experiences: 
“Where am I from? I tell [people] I am from the city of Bilbao in País Vasco, the 
Basque Country.” 
William: What if they don’t know where that is? Do you… 
“I say País Vasco is an area on the coast between France and Spain, and if they 
ask more or are curious, I explain that well technically we are inside Spain but 
that our part is different. That we have our own laws and government and, and 
that we’re different from the rest of Spain.” 
 Very few of my informants were so blunt as to say that País Vasco is a territory 
between France and Spain with clarification only if prompted. However, the idea that the 
region is viewed as unique comes out often in conversation, sometimes also with 
qualifying statements such as, “Not that the rest of Spain would agree with me, of 
course.” This uniqueness is embedded in  the language itself, important again because of 
the mandatory language education all children undergo. Whether a child is placed in an 
A-model, Castilian dominant school or a strict ikastola that punishes children for 
speaking anything aside from Euskara outside language and literature classrooms, the fact 
that they must all learn at least the basics of the language helps internalize this idea of 
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language, people, and land being all tied together. In this way, language education, while 
preserving the language and culture of the Basque people, also subtly inculcates 
nationalist ideas in children. While most likely not envisioned that way by the first proto-
Basque speaker, this notion means that so long as the language is spoken, it has potential 
to exacerbate any efforts to centralize País Vasco with Spain or any other power that 
seeks to limit its autonomy. This bodes well for those attempting to pursue nationalist 
agendas and speaks volumes as to why individuals such as Francisco Franco wanted to 
stamp out this ancient language. 
5.4: CONCLUSIONS 
 Language education policies in País Vasco have been put in place so that parents 
can choose what school their child attentions based on the various levels of immersion in 
Euskara and Castilian in which their child is taught. While nationalists and many outside 
the region see choosing Euskara dominant education as a statement of national identity, 
many people – parents, teachers, and students – today view it somewhat differently. 
Nationalist political leanings to have an impact in some cases, but other pragmatic ideals 
also come into play. Whether it is an attempt to make a child more appealing to a 
potential employer or an attempt to acclimate to society a new region, there are other 
competing reasons for emphasizing language fluency. There are also a variety of 
positions on the type of school model that meets the needs of these various goals. At the 
same time, young people are constantly negotiating the linguistic landscape and choosing 
to speak in one language or the other. The shifting youth landscape of the city mirrors 
this shifting linguistic usage. 
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 The development of youth identity in País Vasco is affected by a myriad number 
of factors. Rather than adopting a singular national project as their own, young people 
position themselves through negotiation of these competing interests. This has profound 
implications for the future of nationalist movements in the region because youths are not 
adopting wholesale the monolithic or singular ideals pronounced by either Spanish or 
Basque national projects. Rather, nationalist policies and politics are again viewed 
through a pragmatic lens as they are seen to have counter-balanced centralizing policies 
from Madrid that helped contribute to the current state of economic deprivation in the 
country. This has a moderating effect on nationalist politics which become less separatist 
but at the same time prolong them as the parties promoting nationalist viewpoints are 
seen as the vanguard of regional autonomy and fiscal stability. 
.
 94 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 Nationalism is concept of identity tied to place and group sovereignty. It 
suggests that the group making a national claim has a shared origin and common destiny, 
it is inherently political, and it is directly tied to the idea of a group homeland. While 
some theorists tie the development of nationalist sentiment to ancient roots, this project 
adopts the modernist viewpoint that nationalist projects are much more recent endeavors 
that have been constructed for political or ideological purposes. Advocated for and 
imposed on a populace by political elites, these national projects are homogenizing forces 
that seek to suppress competing identities. Part of this includes the establishment of 
vernacular languages and the suppression of regional variants in order to impose a more 
common sense of uniformity. Part of this struggle includes the standardization of the 
education system and linguistic teaching practices. However, in today’s increasingly 
interconnected world, national projects are challenged by globalizing or supranational 
forces. In the European Union we see efforts made to preserve regional languages and 
identities as part of the EU’s mantra of diversity, inclusion, and multiculturalism. This 
creates a large series of tensions between the substate, state, and EU levels as different 
national projects simultaneously act alongside and against each other. In this middle of all 
of this we see young people growing up and having to negotiate the various meanings 
and identities associated with each political project as they are pronounced in public and 
educational spheres. 
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 This is particularly the case in the Basque region of northern Spain. It has a long 
history of nationalist and separatist movements. The Basque people have inhabited their 
land since before recorded history, and they speak a unique language – Euskara – that has 
become the marker by which people most identify with being part of this group. Over the 
course of modern history, there have been attempts made to both preserve and to suppress 
this regional language in the face of the dominant Castilian tongue in Spain. The 
homogenizing national forces of the central government’s policies were particularly 
profound in the middle nineteenth century under the auspices of the Franco regime. 
Today the situation stands so that País Vasco, one of Spain’s seventeen Autonomous 
Communities comprised of the historic Basque provinces of Bizkaia, Araba, and 
Gipuzkoa – places the two languages in co-official status with each other. This means 
that both Castilian and Euskara may be used in any public setting, official or informal, 
with full legal rights. As part of this umbrella policy, education policies have been put in 
place that allow for curriculum instruction in varying levels of immersion in each 
language with the proviso that language instruction courses much be offered in both 
languages no matter the school model. Basques nationalists trumpet this policy as a way 
to preserve Basque heritage and identity in the face of Madrid’s hegemonic power and 
influence. It is also held up as an example of how País Vasco is able to govern itself 
given widespread autonomy from Spain. Meanwhile the Spanish government marks it as 
an example of how the state recognizes differences in regions that yet still fall under the 
idea of Spanish identity. 
 Because language is key to Basque nationalist rhetoric, its usage and education 
can become very political. It is therefore important to study the ways in which these 
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education policies play out in daily circumstances and the way in which individuals 
affected actually perceive and react to them.  Young people, being those most directly 
impacted by these policies, are therefore the ideal focus of such study. This work draws 
on a series of interviews with parents, teachers and students as they were asked about 
education policies, language usage, perceptions of the Basque education system, and the 
ways in which they see themselves and País Vasco situated in the world of Spain and the 
wider European context. The information gathered is intriguing. Instead of adhering to 
rigid senses of identity as propounded by national elites, it appears that young people in 
particular negotiate competing identities on a daily basis through a series of choices 
surrounding political opinions, language usage, and social interaction. Rather than 
displaying overt tendencies toward one national project or the other, they describe the 
way in which País Vasco is separate and yet integral to Spain and vice versa. Traditional 
hardline nationalists are undercut as these individuals discuss not the need for 
independence from Spain but how the status quo of regional autonomy has helped blunt 
the impacts of financial depression rampant throughout the rest of the country. At the 
same time though, there seems to be little attachment to Europe other than the fact that it 
offers economic opportunities. Just as school model choice seems to be viewed 
pragmatically in many cases, so too does the idea of European interconnectedness with 
little attachment to the idea of European civic ideals. 
 Traditional understandings of nationalism then are becoming troubled in País 
Vasco. Negotiated identities that are affected by daily practices do not fit within the 
understanding of nationalism as constructed and imposed by elites. In its place 
individuals, and particularly young people, sort through competing rhetorics and tensions 
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to adopt practices that nationalists may claim as their own – such as language usage – 
with an eye for pragmatic decision-making. However, in adopting these practices and 
identities, young people simultaneously give a nod to nationalist movements by 
acknowledging their role in society around them. In the Basque region in particular, this 
plays out so that young people may not express the secessionist views of hardline 
separatists but they nonetheless acknowledge the perceived ways in which nationalist 
governments have benefited their region. Language usage and education play a role in 
inculcating nationalist identities and sentiments, but this inculcation does not necessarily 
have the profound impact for which nationalists might hope. They receive continued 
support, but it is a moderate support that views these identities as part of a series of 
practical choices. 
 These results have implications for the study of nationalism and national, 
especially in Europe. Complicated though the current state of affairs is by the pressures 
of extreme economic turmoil, we must begin to ask what the future of nationalism is. Is 
nationalism dead? I would argue not, but the way in which it is viewed, internalized, and 
acted out is shifting. Further work is needed to explore this idea, and a more wide-
ranging study in the País Vasco and the city of Bilbao might yet yield further nuances to 
this idea. Nationalism is still an important force in the region, but the ways we see its 
practices being enacted are shifting. The language of Euskara is still an important 
identifier for individuals in the region, but there are now many perceived reasons for 
achieving fluency in it other than to make a political or cultural statement. 
.
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